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Introduction
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the

people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." 1 Of these expressive rights, the right to petition has engendered the least discussion among litigants, judges, and
scholars.2 The First Amendment Petition Clause is rarely invoked by
litigants as a substantive constitutional right and, when invoked, it affords no greater or different protection than under the Speech, Press,
or Assembly Clause. In fact, the Supreme Court has described the
right to petition as a right "cut from the same cloth"4 as the other
expressive rights embodied in the First Amendment:
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. As a simple illustration of this fact, one need only consult a recent article by former Justice William J. Brennan in which he completely failed to mention petitioning when
he stated: "The American Bill of Rights, guaranteeing freedom of speech, religion, assembly, and the press.... provides a noble expression and shield of human dignity." William J.
Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1991); see also Anita
Hodgkiss, Petitioningand the Empowerment Theory of Practice,96 YALE L.J. 569, 569 &
n.1 (1987) (noting scant attention paid to Petition Clause).
3. See infra notes 213-17, 251-55 and accompanying text. This restricted view of petitioning under the First Amendment does not accord with the importance given the right in
a series of late 19th and early 20th century Supreme Court cases. See The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (right to petition a privilege and immunity of national citizenship); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (right of
access to courts, as component of right to petition government, also a privilege and immunity of national citizenship); see also Crandell v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867)
(stating that a citizen's right to petition is correlative to the plenary powers granted the
federal government). While restricting the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
in the Slaughter-House line of cases, the Court simultaneously emphasized the constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Yet, current Supreme
Court First Amendment jurisprudence has virtually forgotten the Petition Clause and has
buried it within the speech or assembly provisions of the First Amendment. See infra notes
200-12, 250-56, 282-84 and accompanying text.
4. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
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The Petition Clause... was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish,
and assemble. These First Amendment rights are inseparable,
and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional
protection to statements made in a petition.., than other First
Amendment expressions.5

This Article will demonstrate that, contrary to the Court's assertion, the right to petition was cut from a different cloth than were the
rights of speech, press, and assembly. Historically, the right to petition was a distinct right, superior to the other expressive rights.6 The
history of the right to petition reveals that, although originally restricted, it evolved over time in both England and America into a superior expressive right that was subject to few restrictions.7 In
comparison, the corollary rights of speech, press, and assembly were
subject to greater legal burdens.8
History also reveals that in 1791 the definition of petitioning was
much broader than it is today. For instance, petitioning encompassed
both individualand collective written requests to the executive, legislative, or judicial authorities.9 And from its inception, the right of petitioning and receiving redress contemplated quasi-judicial
procedures, such as administrative review. Inherent in the right to petition was the right to a response. The debates surrounding the framing of the First Amendment do not indicate that the original
understanding of the Petition Clause was any different from this historical understanding.
Although the Supreme Court has conceded that the use of the
word "government" as contained in the Petition Clause protects peti5. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
6. Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging... ". An Analysis of the Neglected But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition,54 U. CN.L. REv. 1153, 1165-67 (1986). In
his article, Norman Smith asserts that the right to petition was both distinct from and superior to the other First Amendment guarantees. Id. I agree with and have adopted a great
deal of his analysis in this regard. He also asserts, however, that historically the right to
petition was nearly an absolute right. Id. In reaching this conclusion, Smith omits discussing one important limitation on petitioning: in both England and the American colonies,
sanctions were assessed against petitioners who submitted frivolous, vexatious petitions.
See infranotes 79, 110-12. Additionally, he omits any discussion of the right to petition the
judicial arm of the government. Smith, supra, at 1190 & n.218. Because so much of the
history of petitioning government is intertwined with the development of the judiciary, one
must also examine the evolution of the right of access to the courts in order to fully understand the historical roots of the right to petition government.
7. See infra notes 71-80, 103-09 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 130-78 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 42-57, 89-94 and accompanying text. These petitions were typically
one or two paragraphs long and contained one or more signatures.
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tions to all branches of government, the Court has paid scant attention
to other important historical aspects of petitioning. For example, the
Court has concluded that the First Amendment does not provide a
substantive right of access to the courts; 10 it has granted only limited
immunity to petitioners;" and it has concluded that whatever the
breadth of the right to petition may be, there is no correlative duty on
the part of the government to respond.

2

In analyzing different

claims, the Court has purported to rely on history; however, its historical analysis is frequently selective and misleading. 13 Not only has the
10. See infra notes 196-231 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court has
not specifically addressed the issue, it has limited Petition Clause protection to fact settings
in which associational or speech interests are also implicated. See infra notes 207-12 and
accompanying text. A number of lower federal courts have addressed the issue, however,
and have ruled that the First Amendment Petition Clause does not provide a substantive
right of access to the courts. See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
11. Petitioner immunity has arisen in three different contexts. First, in the context of
libel laws, the Supreme Court has afforded petitioning, like speech, only a qualified immunity. See infra notes 251-56 and accompanying text. History refutes such a limited finding.
Petitioners in both England and America were historically immune from private libel actions unless the petition was republished. See infra notes 257-90 and accompanying text.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, as applied to prefiling factual and legal inquiries,
raises a second immunity issue. Although the colonial assemblies and courts sometimes
assessed sanctions against petitioners and litigants, a subjective bad faith standard governed whether sanctions were appropriate. See infra notes 110-12, 298-309 and accompanying text. Rule 11 uses an objective standard. See infra notes 312-14 and accompanying
text. Because the objective standard encompasses merely negligent conduct, it sweeps well
beyond the scope of the subjective standard historically imposed and is unconstitutional as
applied to prefiling inquiries.
Third, immunity has arisen in context of the antitrust laws. See infra notes 327-49 and
accompanying text. In what has developed as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, however,
the Court has conditioned petitioner immunity on a definition of petitioning that is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. See infra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 234-49 and accompanying text. The debates surrounding the framing of the First Amendment make clear that Congress believed, in conformity with history,
that the right to a response inhered in the right to petition. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. The debates mirror historical practice. See infra notes 75-80, 120-29 and
accompanying text.
13. For example, in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), the Court provided only
a limited historical analysis of petitioner immunity and failed to address the critical historical distinction made between petitions which were confined to the responsible governmental official and those which were republished. See infra notes 250-97 and accompanying
text.
In discussing the right to governmental consideration or response, the Court made no
reference to history when it summarily concluded that, "[n]othing in the First Amendment
... suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals' communications on public issues." Minnesota State
Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984). Again, the Court's conclusion is clearly refuted by history.
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Court elected to grant less protection than history warrants, but it has
also been less than forthright about that decision.
I. Evolution of Petitioning From Tolerated Practice to
Individual Right
Historical practices evidence the superior status of petitioning
relative to other First Amendment guarantees. 14 While it may be argued that tolerance of a particular practice does not establish an individual right, but merely establishes that the practice was tolerated in
some specific instances,15 the right to petition rests on more than historical practice.
When the English government first began to speak of petitioning
as an "inherent right" of citizens' 6 , the rights of speech, press, and
assembly were regulated. These regulations called for and frequently
resulted in punishment.17 Not only did government ordain petitioning
as an individual right, but also treated it as one. Petitioners were not
punished (as they would have been under the regulations specifically
directed to speech, press, and assembly).' 8 The failure to prosecute
petitioners under these prohibitions bolsters the notion that petitioning was, in fact, recognized as a right distinct from speech rights. 19
Petitioning did not evolve into a superior right quickly or without
setback. From its inception in the thirteenth century and for approximately 500 years thereafter, petitioning was not a meaningful right
because petitioners were frequently punished. Even when petitioning
14. Smith, supra note 6, at 1154-75; see infra notes 36-129, 131-78 and accomanying
text.
15. In constitutional doctrine, this right/practice dichotomy is spoken of as a right/
privilege distinction. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of ProtestingToo Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69
(1982). Rights are "interests enjoyed 'as a matter of right,"' and privileges are defined as
"interests created by the grace of the state and dependent for their existence on the state's
sufferance." Id at 71.
16. For example, the House of Commons issued a resolution in 1669 declaring that "it
is an inherent right of every commoner of England to prepare and present [p]etitions ...
Smith, supra note 6, at 1160.
17. In 1648, Parliament, by ordinance, regulated assembly when it required that all
petitions be presented in a peaceful fashion and that each petition contain no more than 20
signatures. Id. at 1158-59. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78. Speech and the press
were similarly restricted by seditious libel laws. Smith, supra note 6, at 1168-69, 1171. See
infra notes 130-78 and accompanying text. The colonial assemblies placed similar restrictions on the right of assembly when individuals joined together to formulate and present
group petitions. Smith, supra note 6, at 1174. See infra note 101.
18. See infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
19. Smith, supra note 6, at 1165-69, 1174-75, 1180.
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was legitimized through written guarantees during that period, the
right was not always tolerated in practice. 20 Petitioning did not mature into an individual right in either England or the American colonies until early in the eighteenth century.21 In both England and the
colonies, the changing political climate was the catalyst for this
transformation. 22
In England, the presence of a strong monarchy had always allowed the British government to suppress petitioners. 3 Over time,
the ascendancy of Parliament counterbalanced the sovereign's
power.' Petitioners did not immediately gain from this shift in
power-they were simply punished by a different branch of government, namely Parliament. 25 Another transfer of sovereignty, this time
from Parliament to the people as electors, was required before petitioning was elevated to an individual right free from punitive governmental measures. 26
In colonial America, the local assemblies ceased punishing petitioners more than fifty years before the Constitution mandated governmental responsiveness to the people through popular election. 27
The assemblies may have abstained from punishing petitioners because the local representatives (who were sometimes punished themselves for their petitions to England) recognized the need to provide a
meaningful channel for redress.28 It is more likely, however, that petitioners were no longer punished by the assemblies because of the
unique features which distinguished petitioning from speech, press,
and assembly. 29 For instance, a petition was not a publication of opinion to the world at large and was therefore less likely to cause political
20. Id. at 1154.
21. Id. at 1165, 1173. Norman Smith asserts that petitioners in England were not punished after 1702. Id. at 1165. He does not cite an exact date upon which petitioning developed into an individual right. Instead, he simply states that petitioning in England "had
become an unqualified right" by the time of the American Revolution Id. at 1166-67,
1173-75.
22. IM.at 1154-77.
23. Id at 1155.
24. See BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 642-49 (2d ed. 1980).
25. Smith, supra note 6, at 1157-65.
26. Id. at 1165-67; see infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
27. Even after the First Amendment was ratified, petitioners were not punished for
seditious libel. Speech and the press, however, were subject to punishment. Smith, supra
note 6, at 117041; see infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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divisiveness.3" Also, because petitioning never dictated a favorable
governmental response, the continued existence of government was
not threatened, which minimized local governments' self-preservation
instincts. 31 Finally, an elected government could not easily punish petitioners because they were also likely to be voters.32 Whatever
the
33
solidified.
had
petition
to
right
individual
the
1789
by
reasons,
An understanding of the history and evolution of the right to petition relative to the development of speech and press rights is crucial
to ascertain the appropriate level of protection petitioners deserve today. Although the First Amendment speaks of the rights of speech,
press, and petition in absolute terms, that alone is insufficient to
evince an original intent regarding the appropriate protection to be
afforded those rights.3 a The only concrete evidence of intent is the
relative protection historically afforded those rights both before and
immediately after ratification of the First Amendment. History in the
35
form of contemporaneous practices provides this missing meaning.
30. See infra notes 171-72.
31. See infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
32. The same argument can be made for those who spoke out against the government
or published anti-government rhetoric. Because the danger involved was greater when
such information was published to the public at large, however, the government was likely
to be more willing to punish speech and to risk public resistance. Furthermore, although
the disenfranchised were allowed to petition government, Smith, supra note 6, at 1172 &
n.112, this large segment of society was without the power to vote in 1789. THE FRA iNG
AND RATIFiCATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 76-77, 132 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis . Mahoney eds., 1987) [hereinafter FR~mAi~m AND RATIFIcATON]. Petitioning enjoyed mass
popularity, however, and transgression of this right almost always met with great public
resistance.
33. Because the Constitution was ratified in 1789 and because it called for the election
of representatives in both the House and the Senate, U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, I point to
this date as the outside date at which punishment of petitioners ceased.
34. Absent an express articulation of original intent, the simple alignment of the rights
of speech, press, and petition in the First Amendment is also insufficient evidence of an
intent to equalize the level of protection to afford these rights. Only an originalist of the
strict textualist variety would argue that the alignment of these rights, and the sweeping
language of the First Amendment standing alone, mandate that these expressive rights
receive the same degree of protection. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original
Understanding,60 B.U. L. Prnv. 204, 205-06 (1980). A theory of constitutional interpretation which "encompass[es] all those and only those instances that come within its words
read without regard to its social or perhaps even its linguistic context" has been rejected by
a majority of theorists, including originalists. Id. at 222; see Sanford Levinson, Law as
Literature,60 Tx. L. Rlv. 373, 378 (1982) (examining the problems of originalism).
35. A precise theory of interpretation, whether originalist or nonoriginalist, is not a
necessary prerequisite to the conclusions reached in this article. For the originalist, the
historical practices dictate both the starting and ending point for discovering the appropriate protection for petitioning. For the nonoriginalist theorist, the historical practices provide only the starting point in determining constitutional protection. The nonoriginalist
may thus advocate greater protection for the First Amendment expressive guarantees than

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[ol215
[Vol.
21:15

A. Emergence of Petitioning in England

By signing the Magna Carta in 1215,16 King John granted the
right to petition the crown to his barons.3 7 By the King's grace, they
were also granted life tenure in land in exchange for their allegiance,
protection, and counsel. 38 On its face, the Great Charter appears to
be a monumental achievement because it represents the first instance
in which British subjects exerted external coercion over the monarch,
exacting the right to petition, among other liberties, in exchange for a
promise of continued loyalty. Yet the only method of enforcing the
Magna Charta was baronial seizure of royal land and possessions each
time John refused or delayed redress. 3 9 This procedure was crude and

ineffective.' Unless the barons were willing to mobilize an effective
armed revolt against the king's forces each time a petition was denied,
the right to petition was little more than a hollow act of grace on the
part of the crown. The exercise of the right to petition could meet
with indifference-even retaliation or punishment-at the whim of
the ruler.
In June of 1215 the barons, as representatives of the nobility,
were granted a personal audience with the King at Runnymede to
present their written petition in exchange for their promise to finance
is historically justified based on extra-constitutional value judgments. Depending on the
theory of constitutional interpretation employed, the historical practices would dictate the
minimum level of constitutional protection to be afforded the right to petition.
36. LYON, supra note 24, at 310; Smith, supra note 6, at 1155. The name "Magna
Carta" was not originally used to refer to the Great Charter of 1215. Rather, the name was
gradually applied to the reissue of 1217. Domis M. STENTON, AFTER RuNYMEDE:
MAGNA CARTA IN TE MIDDLE AGos 21-22 (1965). Any reference to the Magna Carta in
this article is intended as a reference to the Great Charter of 1215.
37. Barons are members of the English nobility ranked below earls and above knights.
38. WILLIAM S. McKEcHNiE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON TmE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 466-67 (2d ed. 1914); Smith, supra note 6, at 1155. John, faced
with pressing inflation, the need to finance a losing war with France, and no system of
taxation, increased both the rate and the frequency of the customary feudal obligations
until the barons mounted an armed rebellion and refused to pay in 1214. McKEcHNIE,
supra at 48-76. In an attempt to resolve the conflict, representatives of the barons met
personally with John and those loyal to him at Runnymede where the barons presented a
written list of their grievances. I& at 36-37. This list of grievances is known as the Articles
of the Barons, a document that is believed to be an initial draft of the Magna Carta of 1215.
Id
Five days of negotiations ensued and culminated in John reluctantly placing his seal on
the Magna Carta, a document consisting of 63 chapters embodying those grievances most
important to the barons. LYON, supra note 24, at 318-19. Chapter 61 declared that "four
barons shall repair to us (or our justiciar, if we are out of the realm) and, laying the transgression before us, petition to have that transgression redressed without delay." Id. at 467.
39. McK~cHNI, supra note 38, at 129, 468-69.
40. Id. at 129.
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the government. 41 Over time, this became the customary practice,
and various segments of society, including knights and burgesses, were
also granted audiences by the crown as the royal government's financial needs increased.42 Like those of the barons, the petitions these
representatives presented on behalf of individuals and their communities were granted in exchange for commitments to make payments to
the crown. 43
44
This process ultimately led to the development of Parliament,
whose advice and consent was often sought by the royal government
before it took action of any magnitude.45 The king's council - which
consisted of judges from the common law courts, officers, lawyers, and
jurists - comprised the core of Parliament, and the king received the
petitions through his council. 46 Some representatives were asked to
act as witnesses to the petitions they presented, and some individuals
appeared to personally present their petitions.47 As a result, the demarcation between representative petitioning and individual petitioning was blurred in Parliament's infancy.
The practice of petitioning also included quasi-judicial functions.
When petitions were presented to the council, the council would examine the petitioners and refer them to the appropriate common law
court.48 As the fourteenth century progressed, the council began re41. Id. at 36-47. On August 24, 1215, John secured a papal declaration that the Great
Charter was void because it was secured under duress. Although the chapters relating to
petitioning were not included in subsequent reissues of the Magna Carta, this Charter was
itself a petition. It established the framework for petitioning and formalized the procedure
by which petitioning would occur. Id at 37-38.
42. Individual writs of summons were sent to some, and general writs were also sent to
the sheriffs of the different communities ordering them to secure the election of two
knights and two burgesses from each borough. LYON, supra note 24, at 424; BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, Tim RooTS OF FREEDOM: A CONSTrrUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 53-54
(1967).
43. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 53-54.
44. The term "parliamentum" can be traced as far back as the reign of Henry H (11541189). LYON, supra note 24, at 413. The word "parliament" was used more frequently
during the reign of Henry 111 (1216-1272). SCHWARZrz, supra note 42, at 22. At its inception, a parliament meant a discussion. Slowly this label became associated with discussions
involving the king and a body summoned by him to conduct business. 1 WiLLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 171 (1st ed. 1956).
45. SCHwARTZ, supra note 42, at 44.
46. LYON, supra note 24, at 426.
47. Id. at 424-25.
48. 1 HOLDswORTH, supra note 44, at 173. Many petitions that were presented directly to the council sought a favor from the king and were premised on the belief of the
petitioner that a fair hearing could not be obtained through the appropriate court. FREDERICK MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 222 (1908). Technically,
the petitioner admitted that he was not entitled to the relief he was seeking because his
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ferring the growing number of petitions requesting individual relief to
the king's chief advisor, the lord chancellor, who was also a leading
member of the council.4 9 The chancellor would make a recommenda-

tion to the council, and the council would dispose of these petitions.50
By the fifteenth century, the chancellor, subject to the king's approval,
possessed the authority to unilaterally refer and dispose of petitions.5 '
Sometimes petitioners were summoned by the chancellor to appear
and testify under oath. 2 From this process, an important branch of
the judiciary emerged: the Court of Chancery. 53
Litigation in the Court of the Exchequer, the Court of Common
Pleas, and the Court of the King's Bench was also initiated by petition.54 Like Parliament these courts evolved primarily as a source of
revenue for the crown.55 Just as the crown agreed to parliamentary
petitions in exchange for Parliament's agreement to finance the
crown, individuals could initiate legal proceedings in the royal court
system by paying a fixed fee to the crown.56
Due to the intermingling of the executive, legislative, and judicial
functions of government, petitioning possessed a very broad meaning
for the British citizenry and was not limited to the submission of a
written document signed by a group or an individual. Instead, petitioning included written requests for relief, examination of petitioners,
and other quasi-judicial proceedings.5 7
opponent had intimidated jurors or gained an unfair advantage in some other way. The
petitioner did not actually allege that the existing court system had provided a forum for
his petition. Id
49. BERNARD O'DoNNELL, CAVALCADE OF JusticE 124-25 (1952); Smith, supra note
6, at 1156.
50. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 173.
51. In 1474 the Chancellor for the first time entered judgment without the consent or
advice of the council. Id. at 403-04.
52. O'DoNNELL, supra note 49, at 125. This is to be distinguished from the practice in
other courts: interested civil litigants, either plaintiffs or defendants, were not considered
competent to testify on their own behalf for redress of grievances until 1843. Id. at 116.
Instead, witnesses testified in support of petitioners' claims. Id.
53. Id. at 126.
54. The Court of the Exchequer dealt with matters involving revenue, the Court of
Common Pleas was concerned with private grievances between subjects, and the Court of
the King's Bench was concerned with cases against important, privileged individuals and
matters affecting the crown. JACK HARVEY & LusLm BATHER, THE BRIsH CONSrrrUTION 330 (2d ed. 1972).
55. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 68.
56. Id. The royal courts soon replaced the local courts, which were privately owned by
landholding lords and barons. O'DoNNELL, supra note 49, at 16-81.
57. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; see generally 10 HoLDswoRTH,
supra note 44, at 326-41.
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Despite its apparent breadth, petitioning was not a meaningful
right. The crown was able to avoid parliamentary petitions58 by not
convening Parliament, by proroguing or dissolving Parliament5 9
before responding to any undesirable petitions, or by invoking the
crown's suspending powers." Also, the king appointed the chancellor
and the council members and presumably chose only those who were
loyal to him. The proceedings of all courts were subject to review by
the council. 62 The crown similarly retained extensive control over the
entire court system, and royal intervention in court proceedings was
not unusual. 3 Finally, all judges served at the royal prerogative, and
uncooperative judges were summarily dismissed. 64
Although this Article focuses upon the individual right to petition, that right evolved from and developed in conjunction with the
right of parliamentary petition.6 5 Additionally, for much of Parliament's early history, members of Parliament represented individuals
and did not represent groups or communities. The history of parliamentary petitioning consisted of a power struggle between the crown
and Parliament until the middle of the seventeenth century when Parliament was finally able to wrest control over legislation from the
crown. 66 Parliament successfully obtained this power because its
members learned they could control the royal response to their petitions by uniting and agreeing to grant financial assistance only if their
petitions were favorably received.67
58. When parliamentary petitions were granted, they were cast in the form of an ordiSCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 72-90.
59. Technically, dissolution occurs prior to the end of a parliamentary session and prorogation occurs at the end of the session. PmLI S. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LAW 125 (2d ed. 1953). Charles II (1660-1685) dissolved Parliament several times to es-

nance or statute.

cape parliamentary petitions. T. ERSKINE
LAND 410-11 (1862).

MAY, THE CONSTrrUTIONAL HIsrORY OF ENG-

60. To subvert the effect of statutes, the king would use the suspending or dispensing
powers of the crown which were designed to temporarily suspend the application of a law
in an individual case where hardship was a likely result. LYON, supra note 24, at 554-55.
The king began using these powers to completely nullify parliamentary enactments. L
61. DAVID L. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE

1485, at 16-17, 20 (9th ed. 1969).
62. HARVEY & BATHER, supra note 54, at 209-10.
63. KERR, supra note 61, at 28-29.
64. FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, 1 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 203-06 (1959). This practice became especially common during the reigns of Charles
II (1660-1685) and James II (1685-1688). ScHwARi-z, supra note 42, at 150-51.
65. See supra notes 43-48.
66. LYON, supra note 24, at 612.

67. Id
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Parliament, armed with the power to legislate, resorted to the
same tactics that the crown had used against it. The petitions of those
who supported Parliament were granted, and the petitions of those
who failed to support Parliament were denied.' Some petitioners
were imprisoned for the subject matter of their petitions. 69 Even the
English Bill of Rights of 1689 which, in theory, explicitly recognized
the individual right to petition free from governmental retaliation and
called for the convening of Parliament for this very purpose, did not
ensure a meaningful right for individuals to petition government. 70
Parliament's power to punish petitioners, however, was shortlived. A receptive attitude toward petitions was soon mandated by
the popularity of petitioning, the strong public opinion against prosecutions for petitioning, and Parliament's increased sensitivity to the
will of the ever-expanding electorate. 71 The last record of an attempt
by Parliament to punish petitioners was in January 1702.72 In that
month, the House of Commons imprisoned two individuals who
presented petitions concerning contested parliamentary elections.73
Because of the public outcry against the arrests, the two were never
prosecuted and were later released.74 Future Parliaments received petitions expressing opinions against the government in "contemptuous
silence" 75-Parliament's only recourse was to vote down such
petitions.
Thus, written petitioning had evolved into a right. This "right"
did not include a right to a personal audience or to argue in favor of a
petition, nor did it include a right to dictate a favorable response or to
demand parliamentary debate or discussion. The right to petition
guaranteed a minimum level of consideration that might only be a
vote to summarily deny a petition.
In 1765 William Blackstone described "the right of petitioning
the king, or either house of parliament" to redress injury as "apper68. Kingsley B. Smellie, Right of Petition, in 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
98, 99 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1934).

OF THE SOCIAL

Sci-

ENCES

69. IE

70. Smith, supra note 6, at 1163; see Tkm FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTON 197 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
71. Smith, supra note 6, at 1162-64. Not only was Parliament informed of the will of
the electorate through petitions and, thus, made more responsive to the wishes of the electorate, but mass petitions also prompted the expansion of the electorate via the voting
reform acts of the 19th century. See HAvEy & BATHER, supra note 54, at 54-62.
72. Smith, supra note 6, at 1162-65.
73. Id.
74. Id

75. Smellie, supra note 68, at 99.
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taining to every individual."76 The only restriction Blackstone recognized was the numerical limitation placed by Parliament on both the
number of signatures and the number of individuals allowed to present a petition.77 Blackstone specifically justified this restriction as a
means of avoiding riots or disruptive presentation of petitions. 78
In a similar vein, Blackstone spoke of the "right of every Englishman" to apply "to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. ' 79 By
abolishing the crown's power to remove judges and mandating they be
removed only at the request of both houses of Parliament, the English
Act of Settlement of 1701 ensured this right by establishing judicial
independence.80 As a result, the right topetition the government for
redress of grievances was free from punishment in eighteenth century
England.
B. Establishment of Petitioning in the American Colonies
It is against the English backdrop that the early American colonial charters appeared. In 1641 the Massachusetts Body of Liberties
became the first colonial charter to provide explicit protection to the
right to petition:
Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free
shall have libertie to come to any publique Court, Councel, or
Towne meeting, and either by speech or writeing to move any
lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to present any
necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information,

76. 1 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, CoMMENTAmns *138.
77. Id at *139.
78. Id
79. Id. at *137; see also EDWARD COKE,SEcoND INSTITUTES *55. Beginning in 1607,
English law also provided an additional restriction on petitioning: the prevailing party,
whether plaintiff or defendant, was awarded costs. 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 538.
This law was designed to discourage meritless actions and appeals. 3 BLAcKsToNE, supra
note 76, at *403-05.
80. JACK P. GREENE, TmE QUEST FOR POWER 330 (1963); SCiswARrz, supra note 42,
at 199.
81. As the colonies were settled, local charters were promulgated by voluntary action
of the colonists pursuant to decree from England. 1 BERNARD SCHwARTZ, THE BILL OF
Riorrs: A DocumENTARY HISTORY 49-50 (1971). The earliest to emerge included the
First Charter of Virginia in 1606 and the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut in 1639. 2
BENJAMIN P. POORE,THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrIUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS
AN
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF TE UNrED STATES 1888-93 (1878); 1 FRANCIs N.
THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS 519-23 (1909).
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whereof that meeting hath proper cognizance, so it be done in
convenient time, due order, and respective manner. '
By the time of the American Revolution, Delaware,'n New
Hampshire s4 North Carolina,' Pennsylvania,16 and Vermont' also
provided explicit protection for the right of colonists to petition local
governing bodies for redress of both individual and collective grievances. Thus, the early colonial governments recognized petitioning as
a tangible right. All colonies, including those which did not provide
explicit protection for petitioning activity, recognized petitioning as a
method by which individuals participated in government and voiced
their views to the local governing bodies. 88
A simple, informal procedure was utilized for the presentation of
petitions in colonial America. Petitioners directly presented written
petitions (usually one or two paragraphs long with one or more signatures) to the court, legislative body, council, or governor.8 9 As in England, the same colonial body often performed legislative, judicial, and
executive functions. For example, petitions directed to the legislature
were frequently referred to legislative committees which would investigate, subpoena witnesses and records, and review deposition
testimony. 90
Individuals or groups also petitioned courts for redress of private
grievances. 9 1 Generally, the local governor and his council acted as an
appellate court when petitioners were dissatisfied with a judicial decision. 92 Many judges were also members of the council and would participate in resolution of the same case at both the trial and appellate
82. GEORGE L. HASKINs, LAW AND AUTHORr= IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 197
(1960); WILLIAM H. WrnTmoRE, THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 1672, at 35
(1890); see Smith, supra note 6, at 1170-71.

83. 1 Del. Laws, app. §§ 8 to 9 (1791); Smith, supra note 6, at 1174.
84. 4 THORPE, supra note 81, at 2457; Smith, supra note 6, at 1174.
85. 2 POORE, supra note 81, at 1409-11; Smith, supra note 6, at 1174.
86. 5 THORPE, supra note 81, at 3084; Smith, supra note 6, at 1174.
87. 6 THORPE, supra note 81, at 3741-42; Smith, supra note 6, at 1174.
88. At the time that the American colonies were being settled, the practice of petitioning was firmly established in England despite the fact that the risks accompanying petitioning continued until 1702. RAYMoND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC
POLICY: PETITONING IN EIGHTEEMH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 13 (1979). The first recorded
petition in Virginia was submitted on June 6, 1607. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 28-30; MARY P. CLARKE, PARLIAME'NTARY PRrVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN
COLONIES 210-15 (1943).
90. BARLEY, supra note 88, at 29.
91. Id. at 23; see Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right To Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances,96 YALE LJ. 142, 144-46 (1986); Erwin C. Surrency,
The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL IHIST. 253, 268-69 (1967).
92. BAILEY, supra note 88, at 25.
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level.93 If the colonists were dissatisfied with the action taken, they
their right of final appeal by petitioning the
occasionally exercised
94
king in England.
As in England, petitioning in America was not originally a meaningful right. Separate forces worked against petitioners early on in the
American colonies. First, the British government controlled (and at
times completely nullified) the right to petition within the colonies.
Both the colonial governor and the colonial judge were dependent on
the king for their tenure of office.9' The English Act of Settlement of
1701, which established judicial tenure during good behavior, was declared inapplicable to the American colonies. 96 The colonial judges
were subject to dismissal at the royal prerogative, and like the governors, their salaries were set by the crown. 97 Petitions to the judicial
arm of the colonial government were not ensured an impartial hearing
because uncooperative judges could be dismissed at the request of the
British government. The colonial governors, under the directive of
the British government, possessed the power to prorogue and dissolve
legislative assemblies.9" As such, petitions to local legislative bodies
could not be effectively redressed as long as the governors were free
to use these powers to circumvent the passage of legislation. In an
effort to achieve greater control over legislation, the colonies attempted to enact triennial acts similar to the English Triennial Act of
1641 which mandated that assemblies be convened at specific intervals
and not be prorogued without the consent of their members. 99 Local
governors, however, routinely thwarted attempts to pass such acts. 1°°
93.

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

1776-1787, at

159 (1969). Most revolutionary constitutions barred this sort of plural office holding. Id. at
160.
94. LoUIsE P. KELLOGG, THE AMERICAN COLONIAL CHARTER 66-67 (1971); see A.E.
DicK HowARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 70-71 (1968).
95. KELLOGG, supra note 94, at 66.
96. BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 68 (1967). Blackstone
characterized the American colonies as "conquered or ceded" territory and declared that
British law applied to the colonists only if the colonies were specifically named in an enact-

ment or decree.

BEVERLY ZWEIMEN, How BLACsor.NE LOST

im COLONIES

119-20

(1990); see also WmLTAM H. LOYD, THm EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 13-14 (1910)
(noting that Blackstone's position stemmed in part from his opinion that the common law
should not generally apply to the colonies).
97. HowARD, supra note 94, at 210.
98. BAiLYN, supra note 96, at 67.
99. WooD, supra note 93, at 166.
100. Id. Because of the distance separating England and the colonies and the growth in
both the colonial electorate and the power and size of the representative assemblies, enforcement of the British will became increasingly difficult. BAmYN, supra note 96, at 71-81.
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A second force working against petitioners were the local assemblies who, during their first 100 years, occasionally punished petitioners for the subject matter of their petitions. For example, in Virginia
in 1677, two individuals were fined for using "objectionable" language
in their petitions. 10 1 Similarly, in South Carolina in 1722, twenty-eight
merchants who signed a petition objecting to a paper currency were
all arrested and fined al,200.12
As in England, history was not one-sided. During the fifty years
prior to the Revolution, individuals presented numerous petitions to
the local assemblies criticizing both their representatives and the legislation their representatives enacted. None of these petitions evoked a
punitive response from the assemblies. For instance, in New York in
1735, several residents of Queen's County presented a sarcastic petition to the assembly which the House journal summarized as follows:
"they [the residents] conceive [themselves] in Duty bound, to lay
before this [House], the [D]esire of the People in general, that this
[House] would do all in their Power, to give the People a new Choice
of [Representatives]." 0 3 The petition was read to the whole House
and was then ordered to lie on the table. 104 At a later time on that
same day, the petition was read again, and the House, in apparent
frustration, resolved that:
[t]he Petitioners [presuming] to [set] forth, that the [visible] Decay of Trade in this Colony, and the [lessening] of the Value of
the Lands in that County, and the Province in general; is owing
in a great [Measure], to the long Continuance of the [Assembly],
is an [unjust] and audacious Charge, highly reflecting on the
General [Assembly]. 105
Although the petition was denied, the petitioners were not arrested or
10 6

fined.

By 1775, the legislative assemblies in most colonies had acquired the sole authority to
appoint judges. WOOD, supra note 93, at 160-61. The governors had lost their veto power
and the revolutionary constitutions mandated specific time periods for assembling legislative bodies and stipulated the minimum periodicities for meeting. Id. at 166-67. Britain's
power over petitioners had eroded considerably.
101. CLARKE, supra note 89, at 129. In a number of the colonies, petitioning was also
restricted by a requirement that petitions be presented in a peaceful, orderly fashion.
Smith, supra note 6, at 1174. This requirement did not impact the subject matter of petitions. Id.
102. GREENE, supra note 80, at 215.

103. 1 JouRNA OF Tm VOTES AND PROCEEDrNoS OF Thm GEMRAL ASSEMBLY OF
THE COLONY OF NEw YORK 687 (Hugh Greene ed. 1764).
104. IdM
105. Id.
106. I&
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The Massachusetts Assembly was even more solicitous of petitioners. In 1724 fifteen petitioners leveled a direct attack on a representative when they questioned the legality of an election in which
Daniel Taft had allegedly received a majority of votes for another
term in office1 °7 The House ordered Taft to file an answer so that the
matter could be heard and resolved.108 Thus, even when a petition
reflected on the veracity of a member of the assembly or was highly
critical of the assembly, petitioners were allowed to voice their objections and to receive a response from the general assembly.10 9 Petitioning had become meaningful because individuals or groups were
allowed to express dissatisfaction with their government without fear
of punishment for the substance of their petitions.
The right to petition, however, was never completely devoid of
restrictions. In response to the great number of petitions, several assemblies promulgated rules and regulations imposing fines against
anyone who filed a meritless petition. 10 Similar enactments, aimed at
"vexatious suits" and appeals, applied in the courts."' The general
assemblies and the courts in the various colonies were empowered to
impose fines and cost awards sua sponte against any petitioner who
filed a meritless petition. 1 2 These enactments, however, did not encompass petitions which "reflected on the house" and were not
designed or applied to squelch criticism of the government. Rather,
these laws attempted to ensure that petitions with merit would be
heard while individuals would be protected from defending baseless
actions.
Petitioning also enjoyed special quasi-judicial protections. Legislative committees were given the authority to subpoena witnesses for
testimony relevant to a petition, and individuals who refused to obey
107. 6 JouRNALs OF THE HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSEMrs 1724-1726
at 6-7 (Arthur Lord et al. eds., 1925).
108. Il at 7.
109. Significantly, under existing seditious libel doctrine, any reflection on the assembly
or its members could have been punished, even if couched in highly deferential language.
See infra notes 117, 143-52 and accompanying text. Both of these petitions were emotionally charged criticisms, yet, the petitioners were not punished.
110. Acts AND LAWS OF Hs M[AJESTY's COLONY OF CoNmEcxcu-r IN NEw ENGLAND
188 (Timothy Green ed., 1750); 6 REconRs OF "m COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND
PROVIDENCE PLANTATONS IN NEw ENGLAND 95-96 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1861).
111. GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF CoNNEcrTcUT CoLrunS 64-65 (Samuel
Greene ed., 1865); see generally 5 Thm STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
LAWs OF VmonNA 477 (William W. Hening ed., 1819) [hereinafter LAws OF VIRGINIA]

(directing that appeals be brought before the county court as a means of addressing "inconsiderable causes").
112. See sources cited supra notes 110-11.
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such subpoenas could be arrested and held in contempt.1 1 3 Upon issuance of the summons, witnesses were protected from prosecution for
statements made before a legislative committee. 1 4 Witnesses were
also privileged from arrest during the hearing and while travelling to
and from the hearing." 5 Petitioners enjoyed special protections and
were rarely punished for the subject matter of their petitions because
the right to criticize the government was implicit in the original right
to petition." 6
Early petitions presented by the colonies to England were composed with respectful language and began with expressions of the petitioners' subservience, loyalty, and support for the crown." 7 Such
petitions were the only authorized channel through which criticism of
the government was funneled. As the Revolution drew near, the colonists' discontent increased, and the tone of their petitions became less
respectful and more caustic." 8 Finally, in the 1774 Declaration and
Resolves of the First Continental Congress which was patterned on
the English Bill of Rights, the colonists proclaimed their right to petition and clearly declared the unrestricted nature of that right: "[T]hat
they [the colonists] have a right peaceably to assemble, consider of
their grievances, and petition the king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations and commitments for the same are illegal." 119
113. RALPH V. HARLow, Tim HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD
BEFORE 1825 at 111-12 (1917); see Higginson, supra note 91, at 147.
114. HARLow, supra note 113, at 112.
115. Id. In Virginia, courts awarded witness fees to those testifying on behalf of the
parties. The fee, determined by miles traveled to testify and time spent in attendance, was
in the form of tobacco and paid by the party calling the witness. 5 LAWS OF VIRGINIA,
supra note 111, at 480.
116. RICHARD L. BUSHMAN, KING AND PEOPLE IN PROVINCIAL MASSACHUsETrs 46-47
(1985).
117. In 1664 a petition from Massachusetts to the king stated:
If your poore subjects, who have remooved themselves into a remote corner of
the earth to enjoy peace with God and man, doe in this day of theire trouble
prostrate themselves at your royal feete, and begg yor favor, wee hope it will be
graciously accepted by your magestie, and that as the high place you susteine on
earth doeth number you here among the gods, so you will imitate the God of
heaven, in being ready to mainteyne the cause of the aflicted and the right of the
poore, and to receive their cries and addresses to that end.
Id.

at 47 (quoting 4 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSErS

BAY 129-30 (Shurtleff ed.)).
118. Id. at 50-53.
119. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 95 & n.4 (1973) (quoting ELIZAaETH G. BROWN, BRrISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836 at 21 (1964));
see also 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 215 (discussing resolutions adopted by the First

Continental Congress); Smith, supra note 6, at 1173-74 (noting the codification of the right
to petition in the colonies and states).
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This assertion of an unqualified right to petition may have been
the result of the local assemblies' painful first-hand experience with
representative government. Because the assemblies were denied a

meaningful channel to complain against the home government's action, inaction, and abuse, the assemblies may have understood the futility of recognizing the right of petitioning without a corresponding

prohibition against governmental retaliation. The assemblies' demand
that England recognize an unqualified right to petition the home gov-

ernment mirrored their treatment of petitioners within the colonies
for the fifty-year period preceding the Revolution. The right to petition had evolved so that the government no longer sanctioned punish-

ment for the subject matter of petitions.
C.

Petitioning Historically Included the Right to a Response

Inherent in the right to petition was a corresponding right to a
response. 12° Because so many petitions were presented to the colonial
assemblies, petitions were often referred to committees for consideration. 121 Petitions were occasionally held over to the next session if a
committee needed additional time to investigate and reach a decision' ---but petitions were always answered."2 Although complaints
arose about the slow administration of justice within the judicial system, colonial courts, like the assemblies, did not and could not restrict
or refuse access when petitions became numerous; they simply labored more slowly."2 As in England, the right to a response did not
120. See BAILEY, supra note 88, at 36, 166-74; I-igginson, supra note 91, at 145-49, 155.
121. HARLow, supra note 113, at 17; Smith, supra note 6, at 1173; see also CLARKE,
supra note 89, at 210-12 (discussing the procedure for submitting petitions in the American
colonies).
122. BARLEY, supra note 88, at 31. In Massachusetts the House of Representatives ordered the clerk to lock up all petitions that were being held over to the next session in
order to protect them from tampering and to ensure that none were removed before they
were considered by the House. 37 JoURNALS OF T=E HOUSE OF REPREsENTATrVES OF

MASSACHUSEM-s, supra note 107, at 201.
123. BAILEY, supra note 88, at 29-31. When the number of private petitions to the
Connecticut Assembly became great in 1762, the Assembly ordered that the petitions be
recorded and that a few be placed on the docket for consideration each day until all petitions were heard or resolved. 12 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECrICUT

63 (Charles J. Hoadley ed., 1881).
124. See generally Surrency, supra note 91, at 255-57. The local assemblies utilized private petitions as a way of extending their authority. Higginson, supra note 91, at 152. If a
court dealt an injustice to a petitioner by denying access, the assemblies were frequently
willing to hear an "appeal." Id. at 154. This check on the court was a likely deterrent to
such actions even when the courts were understaffed and greatly burdened by the everincreasing number of petitions presented.
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include the right to a favorable response or to demand a hearing.
The
125
right could encompass a summary vote to deny a petition.
As petitions became more numerous, attempts were made in several of the colonies to obviate assembly consideration. 26 For example, in Virginia royal governors twice attempted to forbid petitions on
controversial issues. First, in 1675 Governor Berkeley issued a proclamation forbidding any petitions concerning Bacon's Rebellion. 2 7
Second, in 1688 Governor Howard, the Baron of Effingham, demanded that the General Assembly give all petitions directly to him
and his council for redress.' 28 These and other attempts to deny assembly consideration of petitions were promptly disallowed by either
the colonial assemblies or the British government. The right to petition, including the right to a response, became firmly embedded in
pre-Revolutionary colonial America. 12 9

II. The Right to Petition Was Distinct From and Superior to
the Rights of Speech and Press
The rights of speech and press evolved much more slowly in England than the right to petition. 3 ' The English Bill of Rights of 1689,
while providing explicit protection for the right to petition, made no
mention of an individual right of speech or of any rights of the
press.' 3 ' In the first years following the Revolution of 1688, press licensing laws remained in effect. 32 Although these laws expired in
1694, the press continued to be controlled through application of the
law of seditious libel133 and treason. 134 The judicial extension of trea125. See supra notes 75-79; infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text; see also Smith,
supra note 6, at 1175.
126. Higginson, supra note 91, at 148-49; Smith, supra note 6, at 1172.
127. BAILEY, supra note 88, at 36-39; sources cited supra note 126.
128. See sources cited supra note 127.
129. Id.
130. Smith, supra note 6, at 1168-69.
131. FREDERICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND: 1476-1776, at 381
(1952).
132. Id. at 300-01. These licensing laws originated with Henry VIII (1509-1547) by
proclamation in 1538. Id. at 48. The laws required that all books printed in English must
receive prior approval by members of the Privy Council. Id at 49. Penalties for violation
included forfeiture of all goods and chattels, fines, and imprisonment. Id. In 1586 Elizabeth I (1558-1603) issued the most comprehensive licensing scheme for the press by Star
Chamber Decree. Id. at 61. The decree allowed unrestricted search of printers' presses
and seizure of all printing equipment used for unlicensed printing. Id. at 84-85.
133. Smith, supra note 6, at 1168. The crime of seditious libel originated in the 1606
case of De Libellis Famosis,77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1606). Prior to this decision,
libel was a purely private action for damages. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 8 (1964). De Libel-
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son via the doctrine of constructive treason allowed for greater controls over the press.135 Although only three printers were executed
for treason during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 36 this extreme penalty was a likely deterrent to a free press.
Seditious libel laws provided another and more effective method
for suppressing the press. 37 The definition of seditious libel was very
broad, encompassing "any reflection on the government in written or
printed form.'1 38 While intent to publish the material was required,
actual intent to produce sedition was not. 39 Convictions were relatively easy to obtain because the judge determined whether the publication was seditious and whether malice was shown. 40 The
truthfulness of the published material was not an affirmative defense
and in fact, was not even considered relevant to these prosecutions.' 4 '
Penalties were less severe than those levied for treason, and included
fines and imprisonment for indefinite terms. 42
Although members of Parliament possessed the privilege of free

speech, 43 Parliament punished as seditious libel all reports of parliamentary proceedings, including any critical discussions of these proceedings, on the theory that free speech in Parliament was necessary
for effective government. Because parliamentary measures were
lis
Famosis was a clear break from precedent with the obvious purpose of allowing the
British government to suppress critical political speech. Id. at 8-11.
134. Smith, supra note 6, at 1168. The law of treason originated in England in a 1352
statute that criminalized: "(1) compassing or imagining the king's death, (2) levying war
against the king, or (3) adhering to his enemies." SmBERT, supra note 131, at 265.
135. As originally defined, treason required an overt act evidencing an intent to murder
the king or to levy war or to adhere to the king's enemies. Id. at 266. Under the doctrine
of constructive treason, any writing that evinced such an intent was found sufficient to
constitute an overt act. Id.
136. In 1584 William Carter was executed for a publication that allegedly called for the
assassination of Queen Elizabeth I. Id.at 90, 265. John Tvyn was executed in 1664 for
printing a book advocating revolution and government by the people. Id. at 267. William
Anderton was executed in 1693 for two publications which were found to advocate rebellion and called for the return of King James II to the throne. Id. at 267-68.
137. Id. at 269; see Smith, supra note 6, at 1168-69.
138. SIEBERT, supra note 131, at 271. The breadth of this doctrine was based on the
prevailing notion that in order to have a successful government, all subjects must have a
positive opinion about their government. Id.
139. Id. at 273.
140. Id The jury only determined such facts as whether the material was published by
the accused. Id. It was not until a 1796 act of Parliament that the jury was allowed to
determine malice and intent. Id. at 274.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 268-70.
143. Immunity for statements made in a parliamentary session was secured by Parliament as a result of the Revolution of 1688. CARL F. WmrrKE,THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 30 (1921).
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often enacted after much debate and great differences of opinion,
such internal discussions were deemed absolutely privileged from disclosure to the public.144 Due to public opposition, the House of Commons no longer punished accurate publication of its debates after 1771
but continued to punish as libel those publications that allegedly misrepresented these debates. 45 In an effort to prohibit publication of its
proceedings, Parliament sometimes completely barred reporters from
its sessions.' 46 Additionally, Parliament taxed publishers through the
early part of the nineteenth century. 47 It was not until 1860 that these
suppressive practices ceased in England."48
Press licensing laws survived in colonial America until 1720, approximately a quarter century after the expiration of the British licensing laws. 49 These laws restricted expression to those few printers
the government approved.
The laws were allowed to lapse in the
face of the emerging eighteenth century belief that speech was a right
enjoyed in common by all people.' 51 As in England, the colonial government removed these prior restraints on speech only to replace
them with the possibility of subsequent punishment for seditious
libel. 152
These practices were generally accepted throughout the early
part of the eighteenth century by both the British and the American
colonists who understood freedom of speech to mean nothing more
than an absence of prior restraints. 53 Critical speech was suppressed
for two reasons. First, the government was viewed as superior to the
individual citizen and was therefore justified in suppressing critical
speech as a method of self-preservation.' 54 Also, truth was thought to
be absolute, and there could be no tolerance for any ideas or opinions
which differed from the orthodox view of the government. 55
144. SIEBERT, supra note 131, at 346-47; see 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 376-77.
145. SIEBERT, supra note 131, at 361-62.

146. 1& at 362. During the 1775 debates on the American colonies, the press was not
allowed to attend sessions of Parliament. Id.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id
149. PATRICK M. GARRY, THE AhMRIcAN VISION OF A FREE PRESS 37 (1990); Smith,

supra note 6, at 1171.
150. GARRY, supra note 149, at 37-38.
151. Id. at 38; Smith, supra note 6, at 1168.
152. GARRY, supra note 149, at 40.
153. LEvY, supra note 133, at 16-17; see also FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER
TO JEFFERSON 103-05 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).

154. LEVY, supra note 133, at 16.
155. Id
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This restrictive theory of speech seems to conflict with historical
accounts of frequent and vehement criticism of government by the
press and by individuals during the period immediately preceding the
American Revolution.' 56 Political debate was accepted and criticism
of England's governance was widespread. Although less numerous
than in England, seditious libel prosecutions for speech critical of local
governing bodies did occur."5
Despite the repressive governmental response to critical political
59
expression,158 many printers did publish anti-revolutionary rhetoric.
This may be attributed in part to the divergent views held in the different colonies on various political issues. 6 People intent on publishing material offensive to the governing authority in one colony could
simply move to another colony where the government was more tolerant of written opinions. 6 ' The fact that printers risked punishment by
publishing objectionable material throughout the late eighteenth century did not alter the law.' 62 Seditious libel laws existed in all of the
colonies, 163 and punishment for statements critical of the government
was an accepted, lawful practice which continued even after the framing and ratification of the First Amendment.' 64 Although the press
was used throughout the Revolution to unite and inform the colonists,
the press could play a politically divisive role through its ability to
reach so many people. 6 The revolutionary movement utilized the
doctrine of seditious libel as its tool for suppressing critical political
speech.
In comparison, the right to petition was far less restricted and was
the only authorized means by which individuals could speak out
against governmental action. 66 It is likely that individuals were al156. Id. at 18-19; Smith, supra note 6, at 1174.
157. LEVY, supra note 133, at 18-19.

158.

LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PPXSS

x, xvi-xvii (1985).

159. Id. at xvi.
160. GARRY, supra note 149, at 39; see LEvY, supra note 158, at 16-17.
161. LEVY, supra note 158, at 16-17.
162. Id. at 266-73.
163. Thus, freedom of speech was "dependent upon government sufferance." Id. at xvi;
see Smith, supra note 6, at 1174-75.
164. LEVY, supra note 158, at xvi; Thomas I. Emerson, ColonialIntentions and Current
Realities of the FirstAmendment, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 737, 738-39 (1977); Smith, supra note
6, at 1174-75. The argument that the First Amendment was not meant to abrogate seditious libel laws is not new and, in fact, can be traced back to 1920. David A. Anderson,
Levy v. Levy, 84 MicH. L. Rnv. 777, 781 n.22 (1986); Edward S. Corwin, Freedom of
Speech and Press Under the FirstAmendment: A Resume, 30 YALE LJ. 48, 49-50 (1920).
165. GARRY, supra note 149, at 45-47.
166. See supra notes 103-09, 116-18 and accompanying text.
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lowed to petition government without fear of reprisal because petitioning did not present the same potential threat to the patriot cause
as did the unrestricted freedom to publish. A petition signed by an
individual or group and submitted to an assembly, even if highly critical of the assembly, was not a likely threat to the continued existence
of the government or the assembly. Thus, the theory of self preservation that underlies the seditious libel laws was not present.
The right to petition consisted of a right to complain and a concomitant right to receive a response. 167 Like British citizens, the colonists did not possess a right to dictate a favorable response or to shape
governmental policies and laws.168 Laws restricting the number of signatures and the number of people allowed to present a petition 6 9 and
requiring the peaceful and orderly presentation of petitionse7 ° minimized the likelihood that large coercive groups would organize and
present mass petitions to the assemblies. Thus, petitioning was not as
effective a method for spreading propaganda unless the petitions were
subsequently published in a newspaper, pamphlet, or the like. In both
England and colonial America, presentation of a petition to government was not a "publication" under the existing libel law.' 7 ' In the
case of subsequent publication, however, the petitioner or the individual responsible for publication of the petition could be subject to prosecution for seditious libel, but not for the subject matter of the
petition as originally presented to the government. 7 2 These features
distinguished petitioning from the rights of speech and the press and
held petitioning in a superior status.
Influential writers espoused toleration of critical political speech
during the period immediately preceding the framing and ratification
of the First Amendment.'
Their libertarian views, however,
emerged as colonial society was in transition. 174 Although considera-

ble debate exists about the content and meaning of that era's libertarian thought about freedom of speech and the press, the academic

167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra notes 120-25, 187 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75-79, 125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 101.

171. 8

HoLDswoRTH,

supra note 44, at 376.

172. Rex v. Salisbury, 1 Ld. Raym, 341 (1699); Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. 129, 144-45

(Vt. 1802).
173. LEVY, supra note 158, at 289-94.
174. Id.; Emerson, supra note 164, at 738-39.
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community agrees that seditious libel laws existed in the colonies. 175
In 1798, seven years after ratification of the First Amendment, the
Sedition Act was passed by Congress and a number of individuals
were prosecuted under it.'7e However, not a single petitioner was
prosecuted. 177 The existence of both state seditious libel laws and the
Federal Sedition Act coupled with the failure to prosecute petitioners
under those laws indicate that there was no original intention to raise
freedom of speech and the press to the level of protection given to
petitioning. 178
II.

The Right to Petition Received Protection in the Bill of

Rights
On June 8, 1789, James Madison read nine amendments, embodied in twenty-six separate paragraphs, to the House of Representatives and requested that the House go into a committee of the whole
to consider the amendments. 79 In these amendments the rights of
assembly and petition were originally envisioned by Madison as an
amendment separate from freedom of religion, speech, and the press:
The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling
and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the
legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their
grievances.
175. LEVY, supra note 158, at 289-94. But see David M. Rabban, The AhistoricalHistorian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 795, 852-54 (1985); accord Anderson, supra note 164, at 783-86.
176. Professor Levy argues that the libertarian or "Jeffersonian" view of freedom of
expression began to garner mass support in America in 1798. Levy, supra note 158, at 301.
The reason for this sudden change, Levy asserts, is that Jefferson's supporters feared the
Adams administration would use the Act to suppress critical political speech and thereby
ensure re-election in 1800. IL at 300-01. Thus, it was politically expedient to express the
view that the Sedition Act violated the First Amendment. Id.; see Smith, supra note 6, at
1175-76.
177. Smith, supra note 6, at 1176. There were 17 prosecutions under the Act. IL One
petitioner, Jerediah Peck, was indicted for a petition which advocated repeal of the Sedition Act, but, due to mass public opposition to his prosecution, the case was dropped. Id.
178. In fact, the majority of Framers and ratifiers did not specifically articulate any view
as to the meaning of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Levy, supra note 158, at
266-74.
179. THE FRAMING AND RATFICATION OF THE CONST
ON 311-12 (Leonard W.
Levy & Dennis L Mahoney eds., 1987).
180. 1 Docu
ArraY HisToRY OF TII FhRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNrED
STATES OF AMERICA 1789-1791 at 10, 16 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds.,
1986) [hereinafter DocurENTARY HIsTORY]. Assembly and petition became closely
aligned during the 18th century due to the enormous popularity of group meetings for the
purpose of formulating and signing collective petitions. Smellie, supra note 68, at 99-100;
Higginson, supra note 91, at 155-56.
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A select committee of the House of Representatives was appointed to review the amendments, and on July 28, 1789, the committee issued a report delineating the amendments as modified.181 There
is no record of the committee discussions and thus no indication as to
why speech, press, assembly, and petition were consolidated into a single amendment and altered to read:
The freedom of speech, and of the press, and the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common
good, and to apply to the government for redress of grievances
shall not be infringed." 8
The most significant change to the amendment for the right to
petition was the substitution of the word "government" for the word
"legislature.""'83 This change implies a broad vision of petitioning,
consistent with the British and colonial experience - a vision which
encompassed the past practices of written application to the executive
or legislative branch and initiation of judicial proceedings or requests
for judicial review." 8 Also, given the "tripartite" system or "coequal
nature" of government so recently created by the Constitution, application to government would logically include application to all three
branches. 8 5 This, however, does not represent the full extent of the
changes made to the Petition Clause of what would become the First
Amendment.
After the House of Representatives reviewed the committee report, it debated amending the petition guarantee. Specifically, the debate focussed on whether to bind legislators to raise specific issues and
to vote for or against legislation when individuals or communities
"were committed to particular views they wished to have represented
no matter what influence was brought to bear against their representatives."' 86 This proposed change was defeated in the House on August 15, 1789, by a vote of forty-one to ten - the consensus was that
181. 1 DOCUMENTARY HisTORy, supra note 180, at 27-28.
182. Id. at 28; Smith, supra note 6, at 1175 (quoting 1 ANAm.s OF CONGRESS 685-92
(1789)).
183. Smith, supra note 6 at 1175; Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the
Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059 (1973).
184. Note, supra note 183, at 1059-60.
185. Id. at 1059. Supreme Court precedent accords with this conclusion. See infra note
197 and accompanying text.
186. 2 SCHwARTz, supranote 81, at 1092-95,1098-1103; Smith, supranote 6, at 1175; see
BAiLYN, supra note 96, at 84-85. This concept of "actual representation" worked only in a
homogenous society. BAILEY, supranote 88, at 168-73. Legislators introduced petitions to
carry out the will of their constituents. Id. In some instances, petitions were used to poll
the electorate on particular legislative measures. Id. at 31. If enough counterpetitions
were presented, the measure was not adopted. Id.
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Congress had a duty to consider petitions, but individual representatives were not bound to act favorably upon or to support the sub187
stance of the petitions presented on behalf of each constituent.
Nevertheless, the original understanding of the First Amendment Petition Clause included a duty of governmental consideration.
On the same date, a motion to strike the words "assemble and"
was made in order to eliminate the explicit right to assemble. The
motion was made because the sponsor considered the right to assemble implicit in the First Amendment; the motion was defeated.1 8 In
fact, a number of representatives argued that the right to assemble
was "trifling" in comparison to the rights of speech, press, and petition.1 89 These representatives believed that inclusion of "assemble

and" suggested an exacting enumeration of the components of each
right. 90 This sentiment did not carry the day, but those who opposed
the motion to strike the words "assemble and" did not do so because
assembly and petition were inextricably linked as a single right.' 9 '
The debates over the Petition Clause make clear that assembly was
often a necessary component to the creation of collective petitions.
The debates also indicate that the Framers wanted to ensure the asin order to make meaningful the right of collective
sembly right
petition.192
187. 2 SCHWARTz, supra note 81, at 1146. The Senate also considered amending the
petition guarantee to include a right of individuals to give binding instructions to their
representatives. This proposal, however, was defeated. IAL; see also Higginson, supra note
91, at 156 (noting that while Congress had a duty to receive and consider petitions, its
members were not obligated to support a constituent's petition).
188. 2 ScHwARrz, supra note 81, at 1052.

189. IM.One delegate sarcastically queried that if the right to assemble were enumerated, "why not also the right to wear one's hat as he pleases or to go to bed when one
chooses?" Id.
190. Id. at 1052, 1089-90.
191. "If the people could be deprived of the power of assembling under any pretext
whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause." Id.
at 1090. Those who spoke in favor of the motion to strike the words "assemble and"
agreed that assembly was a component of the other expressive rights of the First Amendment: "If people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a selfevident, unalienable right which the people possess .... " Id.
192. During the debates over whether to amend the Petition Clause to allow binding
instructions, the Framers were in agreement when they spoke of the necessity of the right
of the people to assemble and "consult for the common good" as a prerequisite to the
formation of petitions. Id. at 1092, 1094. It was in this manner which the colonists expressed their dissatisfaction with both the British and the colonial government and exercised their power in numbers. The Framers realized that without the power to assemble,
the right to formulate collective petitions was greatly diluted.
Given the final punctuation of the First Amendment, it is important to understand the
link the Framers made not only between assembly and petition but also between assembly
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On September 4, 1789, the Senate modified the amendment by
substituting the words "to petition" for the words "apply to."'193 The
Senate made some other minor changes, and on September 24, 1789,
twelve amendments were finalized, approved by two-thirds of both
Houses of Congress, and ready to be presented to the states for ratification.' 94 Virtually no record of the state ratification debates exists
beyond a tally of the actual vote.' 95 Although the records of debates
surrounding the framing and ratification of the petition guarantee are
sparse, they evince no intent to change the original British and colonial experiences whereby the right to petition was subject to few restrictions and included a corresponding duty of governmental
response.

IV.

An Examination of Supreme Court Doctrine

Based on the history and evolution of the right to petition relative
to the rights of speech and the press, this Article next focuses on a
number of different contexts in which the Supreme Court has or has
not addressed the right to petition. The Article then examines the
impact of these decisions. The Supreme Court has unfortunately
failed to recognize either legitimate petitioning activity or the superior
status historically afforded petitioning. As a result, the Court has reand speech. In both the House and the Senate, the early versions of the First Amendment
the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses were separated by a comma; the conjunctive "and" was used to separate the last two clauses. Ide at 1122, 1148, 1153. Very late
in the formulation process and without any record of discussion, however, semicolons were
substituted for the commas and the disjunctive "or" was substituted for the conjunctive
"and" between the Speech and Press Clauses. Id. at 1160. The rights of assembly and
petition remained separated by a comma and the conjunctive "and." Id.
If a strict textualist theory of interpretation were applied to the First Amendment, one
might conclude that assembly, linked as it is to petition in a single clause, implies no separate or individual First Amendment right to petition government for redress of grievances.
Strict textualism has been rejected by a majority of theorists, see supra note 34, and the
debates show that, although assembly was frequently linked to petitioning, it was not intended to be linked exclusively to petitioning.
193. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 180, at 36 & n.12; Smith, supra note 6, at
1182. The Senate modification closely resembles the First Amendment as ratified.
194. FRAMiNG AND RATFCATION, supranote 32, at 315-16. On October 2,1789, President Washington sent the proposed amendments to the states for consideration. 2
ScHwARrz, supra note 81, at 1171. 'Iwo amendments dealing with congressional representation and salaries were not ratified. FRAMING AND RATnFCATION, supra note 32, at 316.
One of these two amendments was finally ratified just last year. On May 7, 1992, New
Jersey was the last state to ratify what is now the TAventy-Seventh Amendment: "No law,
varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take
effect until an election of Representatives shall have intervened." U.S. CONST. amend.
XXVII.
195. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 1171.
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fused to distinguish petitioning from speech and has refused to afford

petitioning the appropriate level of constitutional protection.
A.

The Right to Petition Must Include a Substantive Right of Access

to Courts
Given both the historical development of petitioning and the tripartite system of government established by the Constitution, the First
Amendment Petition Clause should be read to 6nc6mpass a substantive right of access to the courts.19 6 History notwithstanding, American jurisprudence has suffered due to insufficient recognition of the
First Amendment Petition Clause.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right of access to the
courts is a component of the'right to petition government for a redress
of grievances and is constitutionally protected." 9 In several cases, the
Court has analyzed claims of a right of access to the courts under
either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For instance, in Boddie v. Connecticut,198 the Court held
that the Due Process Clause required states to waive court costs and
fee requirements for indigents seeking a divorce.1 99 The Court ruled
that, unlike resolution of other private disputes, a denial of access to
those who could not afford to pay for a divorce was a denial of the
right to a divorce and a complete denial of the right to be heard. 2 °

196. The right to petition as historically developed, exercised, and understood included
quasi-judicial procedures. Petitions were also used to invoke the judicial process and to
initiate appellate review. As originally proposed, the First Amendment included only a
right to apply to the legislature. Very early in the formulation process, however; it was
expanded to clearly articulate that the "right to petition government" meant the right to
apply to all branches of government, including the courts.
197. California Motor 'fTansp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972);
Comment, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice
Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1515, 1518-19 (1984).
198. 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971); see also Note, supra note 183, at 1055-57 (discussing
Boddie as the seminal case on indigent access rights).
199. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376-77.
200. Id. Although the "American Rule" mandates that parties generally bear their own
litigation costs and fees, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975), exceptions to this rule have been made, particularly when "important constitutional
rights" are implicated. Campaign for a Progressive Bronx v. Black, 631 F. Supp. 975, 981
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,415-17 (1978).
Thus, a waiver of costs and filing fees is an appropriate exception to the "American Rule"
in those instances in which indigents will be completely denied their constitutional right to
petition government.
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In Ortwein v. Schwab,21 a similar case involving a right of access
claim, welfare recipients relied on Boddie to argue that state laws requiring appellate filing fees violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses for indigents seeking to reverse a reduction in
benefits. The Court distinguished Boddie and ruled that a post-hearing review of a reduction in benefits, as opposed to a complete denial
of benefits, did not implicate fundamental interests.'
The Court
found that due process was satisfied by an initial hearing, which did
not require the payment of fees, and that the appellate filing fees were
rationally related to the legitimate state interest in recouping operat20 3
ing costs.
The results in these cases can be read as not offending the protection historically afforded petitioning. The unique circumstances present in Boddie seem to require that fees be waived to allow an indigent
access to the courts, the only avenue by which relief could be afforded. In Ortwein, by contrast, the petitioner was provided redress at
the administrative level and sought discretionary review at the appellate level.2 4 The right to petition was not denied; rather, the right was
burdened as to appeal. The problem is not the results, but the Court's
failure to recognize that the First Amendment Petition Clause should
govern these claims. In both cases, petitioners invoked the First
Amendment Petition Clause.205 The Boddie Court, however, did not
address the First Amendment issue. In a cursory footnote, the Ortwein court concluded: "Our discussion of the Due Process Clause,
however, demonstrates that appellants'
rights under the First Amend20 6
ment have been fully satisfied.,
201. 410 U.S. 656 (1973); see also Note, supra note 183, at 1063-64 (discussing Ftrst
Amendment considerations of filing fees, security bonds, attorneys' fees, and notice or
discovery costs to indigent petitioners).
202. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659. Boddie was also distinguished in another Supreme Court
decision. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443 (1973). In Kras, the Court refused to
waive bankruptcy fees because a discharge in bankruptcy, unlike a dissolution of marriage,
was not the only avenue for a debtor to adjust his legal liabilities with creditors. Id. at 445.
203. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60.
204. Id. at 656-58.
205. At the trial level in Boddie, the plaintiffs argued that the fee requirements denied
them "due process of law by infringing their right, to petition the government for a redress
of grievances, U.S. Const. Am. I." Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968,970 (D. Conn.
1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court's opinion does not reveal whether the First
Amendment was specifically raised in argument before the Supreme Court.
206. Ortwein,410 U.S. at 660 n.5; see also Note, supra note 183, at 1064 (noting that an
indigent's First Amendment right regarding petitions at both the trial and appellate level
remain open questions).
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The only context in which the Supreme Court has been willing to
find First Amendment Petition Clause protection is civil actions in
which collective activity is undertaken to secure legal advice and initiate legal proceedings. In NAACP v. Button,2' the Supreme Court
held that the activities of the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund in soliciting and financing litigation aimed at ending racial discrimination were protected under the First Amendment from state
laws prohibiting attorney solicitation. 20 1 The Court emphasized that
NAACP-sponsored litigation was a "form of political expression" and
was very possibly the only avenue by which minority groups could
petition government for redress of grievances. 20 9 The Court explicitly
refused to rest its decision exclusively on the First Amendment Petition Clause, however, and instead focused on a conjunctive reading of
the First Amendment expressive guarantees and its protection of
group activities, associational interests, and speech on political
issues. 2 10
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court extended First
Amendment Petition Clause protection to unions which utilized collective plans to provide legal advice to union members for personal
injury claims.211 Unlike Button, First Amendment protection was
granted in these later cases despite the fact that the underlying litigation was not of constitutional magnitude. The Court found crucial to
its decision the fact that collective activity was undertaken to secure
meaningful access to the courts,2 12and thus First Amendment associational interests were implicated.
In each of these cases, the Court emphasized the presence of constitutionally protected speech and relied on the presence of collective
activity but failed to squarely address the right to petition. Whether
207. 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963).
208. Id. at 437-39.
209. Id. at 429-30.
210. Id. at 430-31.
211. United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-24
(1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); see also Note,
supra note 183, at 1061 (discussing recent Supreme Court treatment of the right to
petition).
212. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222-23; Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 7; see generally In

re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978) (explaining effect of post-Button decisions). The
Court's emphasis on collective activity lacks any historical basis because the right to petition was distinct from, and superior to, the right to associate. In England laws restricted
tumultuous presentation of petitions, the number of signatures on petitions, and the
number of people allowed to present petitions. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying
text. Laws requiring orderly, peaceful presentation of petitions restricted association in the
colonies. See supra note 101; Note, supra note 183, at 1061-62.
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individuals pursue redress of political grievances or groups collectively
seek redress of private grievances, the Court should focus on the fact
that the judicial process has been invoked. If the Court only grants
First Amendment protection for right-of-access claims when other
First Amendment rights are implicated, then the historically-distinct,
superior right to petition will be lost through collapse into the other
rights of the First Amendment.
Such a collapse has already occurred in the lower federal courts.
A number of courts have concluded that the First Amendment right
to petition the judiciary is not a substantive constitutional right separate from other First Amendment rights. In Altman v. Hurst,13 a police officer who was demoted to foot patrol and denied the
opportunity to work overtime in retaliation for filing a civil rights lawsuit against his employer. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that he failed to state a First Amendment right of
access claim.2 14 The court explained that the Supreme Court's deci-

sion in Button was premised on the presence of political expression,
"not the general right to bring suit in a federal court of law. '2 15 The
court made clear that unless the substance of the underlying lawsuit is
constitutionally protected, "a private office dispute cannot be constitutionalized merely by filing a legal action."2 1 6 Other federal courts of
213. 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
214. Id. at 1244.
215. Id. at 1244 & n.10. This strict reading of Button, emphasizing the presence of
speech on a matter of public concern, ignores other Supreme Court decisions that declare
that First Amendment protection extends to "business or economic activity." Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516,531 (1945). Although Thomas did not involve a right of access claim,
the Supreme Court stated in dicta that: "The grievances for redress of which the right of
petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political
ones. And the rights of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human
interest." Id.; see also Note, supra note 183, at 1061-62 & n.47 (recognizing that speech
need not be "political" to be protected by the First Amendment).
216. Altman, 734 F.2d at 1244 n.10. For more recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit
expressing a similar opinion on this issue, see Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 412 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990); Belk v. Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (7th
Cir. 1988); Phares v. Gustafsson, 856 F.2d 1003, 1009 (7th Cir. 1988).
TWo federal courts of appeal have provided an exception to this ruling in a very limited fact situation-when the employee alleges that an adverse employment decision was
taken in retaliation for filing a complaint or an EEOC charge involving race or sex discrimination. Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448,456-57 (8th Cir. 1985); Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d
1370, 1378 (10th Cir. 1981). The decisions in these cases are premised on the assumption
that charges of race and sex discrimination are constitutionally protected speech because
like Button, they involve matters of public, not private, concern. As such, these decisions
are analytically flawed because they require that the subject matter of the lawsuit be constitutionally protected.
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similar assessments of public employee right-ofappeal have rendered
217
access claims.
Consistent with the historical understanding of the right to petition, the better reasoned approach is that endorsed by the Third Cir1 8 In Bradley, an
cuit in Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Education.?
individual claimed that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a
workmen's compensation claim. 21 9 Although the court refrained from
deciding the right-of-access issue, it indicated a willingness to consider
the claim:
[We are reluctant to foreclose Bradley's claim as a matter of
law on the present record. There is a general principle, the parameters of which have not yet been delineated, that resort to
the courts falls within the First Amendment right to petition.
Arguably resort to an administrative tribunal, even for the noncommunicative purpose of filing a personal injury claim, should
be protected to the same extent.210
The Bradley decision is consistent with several lower court decisions involving claims of retaliation in the form of official cover-ups or
intentional concealment of information necessary to an individual's
ability to obtain redress in the courts. In Harrisonv. Springdale Water
& Sewer Commission," the plaintiffs sued a water and sewer commission for damages resulting from sewage discharge into the plaintiffs' well.m They subsequently filed a civil rights lawsuit alleging that
the defendants filed a frivolous condemnation counterclaim in the initial lawsuit in an attempt to induce the plaintiffs to settle their first
lawsuit and sell their property to the city.' 3 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that if the plaintiffs could prove that the defendants
217. See Day v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 768 F.2d 696, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986) (public school teacher fired in retaliation for filing grievance
not entitled to First Amendment protection for petitioning government because substance
of grievance did not contain protected speech); Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714, 715
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 823 (1984) (public employee's grievance did not address
matters of public concern and was therefore not protected under the Petition Clause).
218. 913 F.2d 1064 (3d Cir. 1990).
219. Id. at 1067.
220. Id. at 1076 (citations omitted). The court deferred ruling on the viability of the
right-of-access claim for prudential reasons. The court found that the issue required resolution only if, on remand, the plaintiff could establish that he was terminated for filing a
workmen's compensation claim. Md;see also Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 959 (6th Cir.
1986). The court in Graham found that the plaintiff had arguably stated a right-of-access
claim when he alleged "that he was kicked off the University football team in retaliation
for filing [a] state court action." Graham, 804 F.2d at 959. The court, however, did not
reach the issue because the claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
221. 780 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1986).
222. Id. at 1424.
223. Id. at 1422.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

fWol. 21:15

utilized their power of eminent domain to force the plaintiffs to compromise their claims, the plaintiffs would establish that they were punished for seeking justice in the courts.22 Such conduct, the court held,
would infringe upon the plaintiffs' "constitutional right of access to
the courts." 2' The court explained:
The cases from this Circuit, as well as from others, make it clear
that state officials may not take retaliatory action against an individual designed either to punish him for having exercised his
constitutional right to seek judicial relief or to intimidate or chill
his exercise of that right in the future.1 6
In Ryland v. Shapiro227 the Fifth Circuit similarly found that
wrongful interference with an individual's right of access to the courts
is actionable. 2 1 In Ryland, the plaintiffs alleged that a district attorney and an assistant district attorney conspired to cover-up their
daughter's murder by procuring a doctor or coroner to declare the
death a suicide, and thereby interfered with the "exercise of their constitutionally protected right to institute a wrongful death suit in the
Louisiana courts." 9 The Ryland court ruled that the First Amendment afforded substantive constitutional protection even though the
underlying litigation involved 0a private dispute which did not impliZ
cate constitutional concerns.3
The lower federal courts are apparently willing to find substantive First Amendment protection in the case of intentional concealment or official cover-up regardless of the nature of the litigation at
issue. A majority of these same courts, however, are not willing to
224. Id. at 1428.
225. IdL
226. Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
227. 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983).
228. Id. at 971-72. In an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the First Amendment
right of access to the courts protected plaintiffs from retaliation by state officials if plaintiffs could prove that the officials initiated a criminal prosecution against them after they
filed a civil lawsuit against the state. Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1386 (5th Cir.

1979).
229. Ryland, 708 F.2d at 969-73.
230. Id. But see Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 814 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 924 (1990) ("The constitutional right of access does not, however, guarantee one the
right to have one's case proceed in a particular procedural posture or the right to a particular form of relief."). Although the Seventh Circuit has discussed a substantive right of
access in this context, it is likely to find that one exists only in limited circumstances:
Assuming the continuing validity of a substantive right of access to the courts, and
even assuming a delay of access may be a constitutional deprivation, here plaintiff
has not alleged in any fashion that he was prejudiced by the delay ... [D]epriving
the plaintiff of ultimate access is essential for plaintiff to allege and prove ....
Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980, 988 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1095 (1990)
(citation omitted).
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extend First Amendment protection to public employee right-of-access claims unless the underlying litigation encompasses protected
speech. 231
These decisions simply cannot be reconciled. This split of authority is a direct result of the Supreme Court's failure to find that invocation of the judicial process is a protected form of petitioning the
government for a redress of grievances. As a component of the right
to petition government, the First Amendment right of access to the
courts should afford substantive protection to all who claim that state
actors have retaliated against them for pursuing litigation, regardless
of whether that litigation involves a private dispute, issues of public
concern, an individual claim, or collective activity. The First Amendment Petition Clause should also extend to protect indigents through
a waiver of filing fees and costs in those instances, such as divorce, in
which the only avenue for resolving disputes is the court system.
B. The Right to Petition Must Include Mandatory Governmental
Response
In both England and colonial America, the right to petition included a right to present a petition and a right to receive a response.
When the Petition Clause of the First Amendment was debated, Congress declined to include a personal right to give binding instructions
to representatives. Congress did agree, however, that the government
was required to respond to petitions. 233 Thus, history clearly supports
a First Amendment right of governmental consideration and response.
Contrary to historical understanding, the Supreme Court has
clearly stated that the First Amendment does not require the government to listen to individuals or to respond to individual grievances. In
the 1915 case Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,23 4 a real estate owner claimed that the Colorado State Tax Commission had unconstitutionally increased the valuation of all taxable
property in Denver by forty percent. The plaintiff argued that it had
no opportunity to be heard in opposition to the tax valuation increase,
2 35
which violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The Court wrote:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See cases cited supra notes 216-17.
See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
239 U.S. 441 (1915).
Id. at 443.
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adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be
done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. Generally
statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person
or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected
in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their
36
power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rulep
In two more recent opinions, the Supreme Court employed identical reasoning to reach the same decision. In Smith v. Arkansas State
Highway Employees, Local 1315, 7 the Court held that the State
Highway Commission's refusal "to consider or act upon grievances"
of public employees when those grievances were presented by the employees' union representative did not violate the First Amendment
Petition Clause.23 8 The Court reasoned that public employees were
allowed to openly petition, but the Highway Commission did not have
an affirmative obligation under the First Amendment "to listen, to
respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain
with it." 23 9

In its most recent pronouncement on this issue, the Supreme
Court was faced with a situation factually similar to Smith. In Minnesota Boardfor Community Colleges v. Knight, 4° a state employer refused to consider petitions presented directly by its employees, college
faculty instructors, preferring instead to "meet and confer" solely with
faculty representatives to resolve certain grievances 41 Relying on BiMetallic, the Court, ruled: "[N]othing in the First Amendment or in
this Court's case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak,
associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or
respond to individuals' communications on public issues." 242 This is

not supported by the historical understanding of the right to petition
and, in fact, is refuted by the debates surrounding the framing of the
First Amendment Petition Clause.2 43
As asserted by Justice Holmes in Bi-Metallic, the right to petition
did not and should not encompass a right to a public hearing.' 4 Such
236. Id at 445.

237. 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 464-65.
Id. at 465.
465 U.S. 271 (1984).
Id. at 275-78.

242. Id. at 285. Although Justices Brennan, Stevens and Powell dissented, their reasoning was based upon interpretation of the First Amendment Speech Clause, not upon the
historical understanding of the Petition Clause.
243. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
244. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
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a requirement could cause any government to "grind to a halt." 45Historically, however, the right to petition did include both the right
to present a written petition and the right to receive a response,
which, at a minimum, might be summary denial.?" A petitioner never
possessed the right to a full legislative discussion or debate of a particular petition, nor to a public forum to present testimony relevant to a
petition, nor to an investigation of a petition, nor to a detailed explanation for the denial or rejection of a petition. Consistent with the
original understanding, a petitioner is entitled to a response, which
might exclude an explanation or simply state that, after consideration,
the petition is denied.247
When understood in this limited sense, these minimal presentation and response requirements will not unduly burden government.
The advent of the federal system and the unforeseen growth of this
nation should not destroy either component of the right to petition3 4
In order to be meaningful, the First Amendment right to petition government for a redress of grievances must also include minimal governmental consideration. 249

245. Knight, 465 U.S. at 285.
246. See supra notes 75-80, 120-29 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra
note 197, at 1525 ("[Ihe state must, at a minimum, accept delivery of petitions...
247. Id; see sources cited supra note 246.
248. Demographics have changed dramatically since 1791 (total population now 226.6
million with only 100 seats in the Senate and 435 seats in the House of Representatives).
See C. HERmAN Parrcssnrr, CONSTrruTONAL LAW OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 169-71
(1984); BuREAu OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNrrED STATES: 1991, at 7 (111th ed.). Members of Congress do routinely respond to their
constituents' letters, however, and are presumably meeting these minimal response requirements as a means of keeping in touch with constituents and ensuring re-election.
Additionally, under the First Amendment, the Court has consistently permitted burdens on government when necessary to vindicate individual rights. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987) (employer may burden an
employee's free exercise rights only when justified by a compelling state interest); see also
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147,162 (1939) (imposing burden upon city "as an indirect
consequence of" distribution of leaflets outweighed by constitutional right of free speech).
Thus, not only is the minimal burden of response placed upon government outweighed by
petitioners' constitutional rights, but the burden is justified by existing First Amendment
precedent.
249. Hodgkiss, supranote 2, at 576 ("The duty to respond is essential to make petitioning a means of participation in democratic decisionmaking."); see also Higginson, supra
note 91, at 165-66 (The original meaning of the right to petition included a right to "fair
hearing and consideration.").
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C. The Court's Failure to Grant Absolute Immunity to Petitioning
Petitioners were historically protected from both seditious libel
prosecutions and private libel actions. 250 The Supreme Court has ignored this history and has applied the same qualified immunity given
speech and the press to the information contained in petitions. As a
result, petitioners receive less protection than is historically justified.
In McDonald v. Smith, 5 the Supreme Court addressed a petitioner's claim of absolute immunity in a private libel action based on
information contained in two letters to the President of the United
States. -25 The petitioner, Robert McDonald, wrote the letters urging
against the appointment of David Smith as a United States Attorney.
The Supreme Court rejected McDonald's claim that statements made
in a petition are absolutely immune from a subsequent libel action.
The Court specifically held that the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment does not enjoy a preferred status relative to the rights of
speech and the press. In reliance on the 1845 decision in White v.
Nicholls,253 the Court added that petitioners have not been historically
afforded absolute immunity from private libel actions." 4 The Court
also implied that the immunity afforded petitioners under the antitrust
laws is not absolute: "[Fliling a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity; but 'baseless litigation is not immunized by the First
Amendment right to petition."255
This last observation is most revealing of the analytical weakness
in the Court's opinion. The Court did not frame the issue properly
when it stated the baseless-litigation restriction on immunity from the
antitrust laws. 56 The Court should have addressed the level of immunity from the libel laws accorded to statements made in the course of
litigation. This inquiry sheds more light on the level of immunity historically afforded to petitions.
The analysis begins with the judicial arm of the government because it is here that the immunity laws originated. 5 7 In 1585 the
250. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
251. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
252. Id. at 480-81.
253. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
254. McDonald,472 U.S. at 483-85.
255. Id. at 484 (quoting Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742
(1983)).
256. For a discussion of petitioner immunity in the antitrust arena, see infra notes 32749 and accompanying text.
257. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 376.
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King's Bench ruled in Cutler v. Dixon 8 that

allegations
Court of the
contained in articles of the peace that were exhibited to justices could
not form the basis9 of a libel action even if such allegations resulted in
"great abuses.""

The court reasoned that "if actions should be per-

mitted in such cases, those who have just cause for complaint, would
not dare to complain for fear of infinite vexation. '260 In other words,
absolute immunity was conferred so as not to chill legitimate court
actions. By the early seventeenth century, the law in England was
settled: judges, parties, witnesses, and attorneys were all immune
from the libel laws for statements made and documents submitted in
judicial proceedings. 61
In the 1668 case of Lake v. King,2 62 the Court of the King's Bench
extended the immunity recognized in judicial proceedings to individuals who submitted written petitions to Parliament. 263 In Lake the petitioner delivered a written petition to the parliamentary committee on
grievances in which he accused the plaintiff, Lake, of "many horrible
and great abuses, such as extortion, oppression, vexation, and other
misdemeanors." 264 The court held:
The exhibiting of the petition to a Committee of Parliament was
lawful, and that no action lies for it, although the matter contained in the petition was false and scandalous, because it is in a
summary course of justice, and before265those who have power to
examine, whether it be true or false.
The Lake decision was clarified in 1699 by Rex v. Salisbury.266
The English court declared that the privilege afforded to petitioners
did not extend to anyone who published the content of a petition previously submitted to Parliament or a court to the world at large.2 67
The court reasoned that subsequent publication "tends to the breach
of the peace. 268 Contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Mc258. 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B. 1585).

259. Id. at 886-87.
260. Id. at 887-88.
261. 8 HowswoRTH, supra note 44, at 376 & n.5; see Ram v. Lamley, 123 Eng. Rep.
1139 (K.B. 1633); Harding v. Bodman, 123 Eng. Rep. 1064 (KB. 1618); Weston v. Dobniet,
79 Eng. Rep. 369 (K.B. 1618); Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1608); Brook v.
Montague, 79 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1606).
262. 85 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1668).
263. Id. at 139; see Smith, supra note 6, at 1187.
264. Lake, 85 Eng. Rep. at 138.
265. Id. at 139.
266. 91 Eng. Rep. 1124 (KB. 1699).
267. Id. at 1124.
268. Id. The court's decision in Salisbury also demonstrates the superior status of petitioning relative to other forms of speech, including publication in the press.
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Donald, the law of immunity was clearly established in late seven2 69
teenth century England; Lake was not an "anomalous decision.
A majority of American courts confer absolute immunity from
the libel laws upon individuals for statements made and evidence submitted in the course of judicial proceedings. 270 Immunity has been
extended to statements made in all types of judicial proceedings, ineluding administrative hearings and other quasi-judicial proceedings.271 Before conferring immunity, however, American courts
require that the allegedly libelous statement "have some reasonable
relation or reference to the subject of inquiry, or be one that 'may
possibly be pertinent,' with all doubts resolved in favor of the" alleged
defamer.272 The showing required to obtain immunity is relatively
easy to meet.
The American courts have not limited absolute immunity to
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings. In fact, the
majority of American jurisdictions have extended absolute immunity
to witnesses who testify at legislative hearings.27 Although very few
American courts have been presented with the immunity issue in the
context of petitions directed to the legislature or to the executive, support exists for the extension of absolute immunity to such petitioning.
In the 1802 decision Harris v. Huntington,274 a Vermont court ruled
that a petitioner who presented a petition to the legislature was absolutely immune from a subsequent claim of libel.275 The defendant and
several others had submitted a petition to the Vermont legislature re269. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 n.4 (1985) (quoting White v. Nicholls, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 266, 289 (1845)).
270. Nancy E. Borders, Comment, Defamation: Republication of Defamatory Pleadings
by a Litigant,20 WAK FEsr L. Rev. 145 (1984); see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 114 (4th ed. 1971). Among the jurisdictions that confer absolute
immunity to petitioners is Pennsylvania, one of the two jurisdictions cited by the McDonald Court to support its conclusion that absolute immunity was not uniformly granted to
petitioners in this country when the First Amendment was framed. McDonald v. Smith, 472
U.S. 479, 483 (1985). The McDonald Court relied on Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & Rawle 22
(Pa. 1815), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended only a qualified immunity
to a petitioner. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was of the opinion that statements made
in the course of judicial proceedings were not absolutely immune from a private claim of
libel. ledat 30. Clearly, this opinion reflects a minority view which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has since rejected. See Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1986).
271. PRossER, supra note 270, § 114 at 779-80.
272. Id.at 779 (quoting Ginsburg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823,825 (9th Cir. 1951), cerL denied
343 U.S. 934, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 958 (1952)).
273. PROSSER, supra note 270, § 114, at 777, 781-82. Pennsylvania is one of these jurisdictions. See Jennings v. Cronin, 389 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 1978).
274. 2 Tyl. 129 (Vt. 1802); see Smith, supra note 6, at 1187.
275. Harris,2 1yl. at 146.
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questing that the plaintiff, Harris, not be reappointed as a justice of
the peace.276 The court recognized the potential for abusing the right
to petition, but granted immunity.'
The Harriscourt cautioned that liability would attach if the petition were republished "in the public newspapers without the order of
the General Assembly, as such publication would not be necessary to
the occasion, nor would [it] be within the course of proceedings in our
Parliament."2 7 Thus, as in England, petitioners were not clothed with
immunity if they published the content of their petition in a newspaper or in some other written communication. The Harris decision by
the Vermont court is well reasoned and comports with the English
resolution of the immunity issue in Lake.
I 2 79 is infirm.
The McDonald Court's reliance on White v. Nicholls
This 1845 decision involved allegedly libelous letters, which were sent
to the President of the United States and to the Secretary of the Treasury, requesting that Robert White be removed from his position as
customs collector. 280 The White Court ruled that these letters enjoyed
only a qualified privilege.8 1 The Court found that if the statements
were not made to obtain redress and were instead made with express
malice, the statements would not receive immunity. 22 In discussing
the immunity issue, the Court wrote that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings did not enjoy absolute immunity from
common law libel claims. 2 1 This clearly contradicts the law in the
majority of American juisdictions.2s4
Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion in McDonald, the
case law supports an absolute immunity from libel actions for petition276. Id. at 130-31.
277. Id. at 146. In Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508 (N.Y. 1809), one justice writing for
the majority argued that a petitioner must be absolutely immune from a subsequent libel
action even if the petition is false and is presented with malice. Id. at 531-32.
278. Harris,2 Tyl. at 146. The McDonald Court relied on Commonwealth v. Clapp, 4
Mass. 163 (1808), another state court decision to qualify immunity for petitioners. See
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 (1985). The court in Clapp extended only qualified
immunity to a petitioner who posted the following petition in several public places: "Caleb
Hayward is a liar, a scoundrel, a cheat, and a swindler. Don't pull this down." Clapp, 4
Mass. at 163, 169. Because this case involved publication to the world at large, absolute
immunity was not at issue. The Supreme Court's reliance on Clapp for the assertion that
absolute immunity was not historically afforded to petitioners is therefore misplaced.
279. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
280. Id. at 267-74.
281. Id. at 291.
282. Id,
283. I& at 288.
284. See supra notes 270-77 and accompanying text.

56
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ers. 285 This case law, while sparse, is uncontradicted. The Supreme
Court's analysis in both McDonald and White is flawed because these
Courts either ignored or misunderstood the case law from which petitioner immunity was derived-" 6 written and oral statements made in
the course of judicial proceedings have been and are afforded absolute immunity from subsequent libel actions. 7
The decisions from England and the state courts that confer absolute immunity focus on the right to petition. The Supreme Court
opinions denying absolute immunity to petitioners give greater weight
to protecting against malicious attacks and allowing vindication of
reputations.m The historical doctrine of absolute immunity from subsequent claims of libel, however, adequately protects individuals from
public and wrongful defamation because it extends only to statements
made to officials who reasonably appear to possess the power to provide redress. Subsequent publication of a petition is not afforded absolute immunity. 289 As such, there is no legal justification for a public
trial to vindicate an individual's reputation if a petition has been confined to the responsible governmental authority.290
285. American jurisdictions extend immunity for submitting a petition "to any person
who reasonably appears to have a duty ... or authority in connection with the matter."
PROSSER, supra note 270, § 114, at 793. English courts, however, require that a petitioner
present the grievance to the court, legislative, or executive body possessing the power to
provide the relief. See, e.g., Buckley v. Wood, 76 Eng. Rep. 888,889-90 (K.B. 1591). If, for
instance, a petitioner filed a lawsuit in an English court without jurisdiction over the controversy, the petitioner would do so at his peril. Id.
286. The White Court also relied on Bodwell v. Osgood, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 379 (1825).
See White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 290 (1945). In that case, the court upheld a
conviction for the malicious publication of a vexatious petition after a groundless petition
was presented to a school committee. Bodwell, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 383-84. Absolute
immunity has never been extended to these types of subordinate legislative bodies. See
Mills v. Denny, 63 N.W.2d 222 (Iowa 1954); Burch v. Bernard, 120 N.W. 33 (Minn. 1909);
Ivie v. Minton, 147 P. 395 (Or. 1915). Such entities do not possess the same powers of
inquiry and investigation as do the legislature and the judiciary. The shield of absolute
immunity is inappropriate where an administrative body lacks these powers. Mills, 63
N.W.2d at 226.
287. See supra notes 257-61, 270-77 and accompanying text.
288. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 470 (1985); White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266
(1845); see supra text accompanying notes 251-55.
289. Most American courts extend a qualified privilege to newspapers and to third parties who publish allegedly libelous statements contained in public records such as judicial
pleadings. Comment, Press Releases and Defamatory Pleadings, 63 Nw. U. L. Rv. 699
(1968). In order to discourage "the filing of a pleading for the sole purpose of circulating
scurrilous charges," some courts do not even grant a qualified privilege to litigants who
republish the contents of documents in a newspaper. Borders, supra note 270, at 147-49.
290. See Smith, supra note 6, at 1188 ("Most of the limitations that have been imposed
on speech and the press, whatever their justifications in the contexts of these expressive
rights, are inappropriate restrictions upon petitioning."). Although information submitted
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Today it is likely that the majority of petitions presented to the
executive or to the legislature will involve fact scenarios very similar
to those presented in White and McDonald: written requests urging
against the appointment of or requesting the removal of a public official for misconduct.291 If a petition is presented to the proper legislative or executive authority and that body possesses the power to

initiate an investigation into the truth of the petition (or, at a minimum, possesses the authority to allow the official to refute the
charges), then the requirements as enunciated in Lake have been met.
Stated another way, the petition has been presented "in a summary
course of justice, and before those who have power to examine,
whether it be true or false. ''292 Even if an official is not provided with
the opportunity to respond to the petitioner's charges, the libel laws
should not afford that remedy. As previously discussed, submission of
a petition is not tantamount to public disclosure, and the real harm
results from the government's failure to allow refutation of the
charges contained in the petition.
The malice standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 293 as applied by the McDonald Court does not provide adequate
protection to petitioners. The standard announced in Sullivan allows
a public official to recover in a libel action if the official can prove that
a published statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or
in both legislative and judicial proceedings is a matter of public record and is generally
available for inspection, the likelihood that such information will be inspected by the general public is low. The potential for harm in this setting is much less than where a document is republished in a public newspaper.
291. Van V. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L. Rv. 131, 139 (1910).
292. Lake v. King, 85 Eng. Rep. 137, 139 (K.B. 1668). Because the proceeding in Lake
was judicial, the argument has been made that absolute immunity should be limited to
judicial proceedings because the petition in Lake was addressed to Parliament, England's
high court of justice. Veeder, supranote 291, at 138 & n.28. The court in Lake did refer to
"a summary course of justice," Lake, 85 Eng. Rep. at 139, but in the 16th, 17th, and 18th
centuries, the legislative assembly was sometimes named the "General Court." Higginson,
supra note 91, at 144 n.9. Ascertaining the meaning of the words "course of justice" or
"court" by reference to their historical context cuts against this argument. See supra notes
34-35.
Moreover, the Lake court could have said "court of justice," did not but use such
specific language. The decision should not be limited to judicial proceedings so long as
other governmental bodies possess some authority to investigate the charges made. Congressional committees, for example, hold the power to conduct hearings. 2 U.S.C. § 722
(1988). Administrative agencies possess powers that are very similar to courts including
the power to administer oaths and to receive sworn testimony. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556
(1988). The truth of a petition may be investigated and ascertained if the legislative or
executive committee chooses to do so.
293. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." '94 Sullivan, an
elected Commissioner of Public Affairs for the City of Montgomery,
Alabama, sued a number of individuals and the New York Times
Company for permitting the publication of an allegedly inaccurate
full-page advertisement which appeared in the New York Times newspaper.2 95 Sullivan is clearly distinguishable from petitioning since the
potential harm from publication in a newspaper of national circulation
is absent if the very same information is limited to a written petition
submitted to the government.
Contrary to McDonald, petitioners should be afforded absolute
immunity from a subsequent libel action for all statements contained
in a petition to the legislature or to the executive. For immunity to
attach, however, these statements must be reasonably related to or
pertinent to the subject of inquiry. They must be submitted to those
government officials who reasonably appear to have the power to redress the grievance. 296 Also, if an individual is being considered for
public office, the information contained in the petition must reasonably relate to that individual's fitness or abilities to serve and perform
as a public official. Such information, if subsequently published to
anyone other than those reasonably believed responsible for redress,
should enjoy only a qualified privilege.297 This standard recognizes
the features that distinguish petitioning from speech, encourages legitimate petitioning, and protects individuals who are the subject of
petitioning.
D. Specific Problems
1. Rule 11's Invalid Restriction on Petitioning
As previously discussed, petitioning was not completely free from
governmental restrictions. The imposition of monetary sanctions or
costs against a litigant originated in the Middle Ages. 298 The English
294. Id. at 280. In essence, the actual malice standard in Sullivan is the same subjective
bad faith standard utilized by both colonial legislatures and courts in assessing sanctions
against petitioners who submitted frivolous petitions. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
295. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58.
296. See supra notes 272, 285 and accompanying text. Contra Comment, supra note
197, at 1525-26. ("Any attempt to delimit the petition right according to the power of the
petitioned department, however, soon encounters insuperable difficulties. For any given
grievance, almost no governmental authority is wholly without power to act on it in some
manner.").
297. See supra notes 266-69, 278 and accompanying text.
298. Anglo-Saxon courts infrequently enforced a rather harsh penalty against a plaintiff
who lost his lawsuit-the plaintiff's tongue was cut out. Note, Groundless Litigation and
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system of amercement required that a losing plaintiff pay costs to the
court for pursing a meritless or "false" claim. 299 The amercement system, however, provided no compensation to a defendant who was
wrongfully sued. In the early seventeenth century, English law reme°°
died this defect and allowed successful defendants to recover costs.3
The American colonies also promulgated legislation aimed at deterring frivolous, vexatious actions. 30 1 The penalties were similar to
those provided by English law in that the court or general assembly
had wide discretion to assess an appropriate monetary sanction
against a petitioner, litigant, or appellafit if it deemed an action frivolous. 30 The colonial laws contained a subjective bad faith standard
for imposition of sanctions? 03 The laws thus were aimed at the same
type of conduct that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure301 was originally designed to discourage-the intentional initiathe Malicious ProsecutionDebate: A HistoricalAnalysis, 88 YALE LJ. 1218, 1221 (1979).

Often, less harsh monetary penalties were enforced against an unsuccessful plaintiff-the
plaintiff was ordered to pay his opponent "wer"--an award based on the losing party's
(plaintiff's) status and not the wrongful nature of that party's conduct. Id. at 1221 & n.27.
299. The amercement system replaced the wer system. IL at 1222; see 3 BLACKSoNE,
supranote 76, at *399. The amount of the amercement award was distinct from wer in that
it varied depending upon "the wrongfulness of the complainant's conduct." Friedman v.
Dozorc, 312 N.W. 2d 585, 595 n.20 (Mich. 1981). An indigent plaintiff suffered different
punishment at the discretion of the court which sometimes included an order that the
plaintiff be Whipped. See 3 BIACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *400.
300. 4 HowswoLRTH, supra note 44, at 538.
301. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the
averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, mption, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
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tion or pursuit of frivolous, vexatious proceedings." 5
Rule l's signature requirement, which operates as certification
that the document is submitted in good faith, can be traced back to
the time of Sir Thomas More (1478-1535) when an attorney's signa3 6
ture served as a guarantee that "good ground for the suit" existed 0
If a pleading contained "irrelevant, impertinent, or scandalous" matter, the court could order the attorney to pay the opposing party's
costs in defending against the pleading or action.C This "good
ground" standard was incorporated into the 1938 version of Rule 11
which required an attorney to certify "that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support" the
pleading.308 A subjective standard was utilized to assess whether the
attorney was motivated by bad faith or an improper purpose3 0 9 The
standard, however, was never well defined and failed to provide
proper notice to attorneys that certain kinds of conduct violated the
rule. 10 The lack of a clear legal standard was not cause for concern
because sanctions were rarely assessed.31
This practice changed in 1983 when Rule 11 was amended, purfiling of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
FED. R. CIv. P. 11. At the time of publication of this Article, this was the current version
of Rule 11. Amendments to the rule may have occurred subsequent to publication.
305. See Robert L. Carter, The History and Purposesof Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
4 (1985).
306. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQunTY PLEADINos 49 (10th ed. 1892). The
historical accuracy of this conclusion has been questioned. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleadingand Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problemswith FederalRule of Civil
Procedure11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 10 (1976). Risinger argues that although the certification requirement originated with Sir Thomas More, the reason for the requirement was not
to ensure to the court that an attorney believed there was "good ground" for the pleading.
Instead, it was to ensure that an attorney was consulted before a pleading was filed. Id. at
10-13. Risinger further asserts that since Story was a United States Supreme Court Justice
at the time he offered his view of the attorney certification requirement, his version of
history was incorporated into Rule 24 of the Equity Rules of 1842, a precursor to Rule 11.
Id. at 13.
307. STORY, supra note 306, at 49.
308. Risinger, supra note 306, at 5; see also Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under
Amended FederalRule 11-Some "Chilling" Problemsin the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ. 1313, 1314-15 (1986) (discussing the historical reasons
for changing Rule 11).
309. Kenneth F. Ripple & Gary J. Saalman, Rule 11 in the ConstitutionalCase, 63 NoTmRDAME L. RE:v. 788, 791 (1988).
310. See Carter, supra note 305, at 5-6.
311. Risinger, supra note 306, at 34-37. Only 11 reported cases found that Rule 11 was
violated over the time period beginning in 1938 when Rule 11 was enacted and ending in
1976. Id.
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312
portedly to provide clarification of the appropriate legal standard.

The certification requirement was extended to specifically include
both attorneys and unrepresented parties who, by their signature,
must now certify "that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it [the pleading] is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law. '313 This
amendment, which requires a "reasonable inquiry" into the facts and
law governing a claim, mandates 314
that courts utilize an objective standard in resolving sanction issues.
The introduction of an objective standard into the sanction equation broadens the scope of Rule 11 to include within its coverage conduct that was not historically subject to sanctions. Although Rule 11
sanctions have strong roots which predate the framing and ratification
of the First Amendment Petition Clause, the colonial legislation explicitly required conduct intentionally designed or "wittingly and willingly" undertaken to injure an opposing party.315 By replacing the
subjective bad faith requirement with an objective standard, Rule 11
now encompasses merely negligent conduct.316 From a historical perspective, these requirements governing the prefiling factual and legal
inquiries sweep too broadly, and as applied, are an invalid restriction
312. The notes of the Advisory Committee for the 1983 amendments clearly state that
another purpose of the amendment was "to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions [citations omitted] by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney. . . ." FED.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
313. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The 1983 amendments explicitly allow for the imposition of
Rule 11 sanctions against a pro se litigant. Id The committee notes, however, make clear
that a court should use its "discretion to take account of the special circumstances" which
may arise when an unrepresented party is involved in the litigation process. FED. R. Civ.
P. 11 advisory committee's notes. This is in conformity with colonial laws which allowed
sanctions to be assessed directly against parties. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying
text.
314. After the amendment, some courts continued to apply a subjective standard. This
practice has since changed, and courts now uniformly interpret Rule 11 to require an objective standard for the prefiling factual and legal inquires. Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A
CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 205-07 & n.94 (1988). Some courts continue to apply a
subjective test to pleadings which are allegedly filed for an "improper purpose," which may
include an intent to delay proceedings, to harass, or to increase litigation costs. See Ripple
& Saalman, supra note 309, at 800-01.
315. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. An enactment by the Rhode Island General Assembly in 1757 provided for the assessment of costs against individuals
who "by pretending to be aggrieved" obtained a new trial. 6 REcoRDs oF THE COLONY OF
RHODE IsLAND, supra note 110, at 95-96. Thus, intent or subjective bad faith was a prerequisite to imposition of sanctions.
316. Ripple & Saalman, supra note 309, at 797 (objective standard interpreted by courts
to require inquiry into what a "competent attorney" would have done under the

circumstances).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 21:15

on the constitutional right of access to the courts via the First Amend-

ment Petition Clause.317
The amendments to Rule 11 may also produce a chilling effect on
petitioners. 1 Efforts are under way to improve some of the potential
chilling effects in the application of Rule 11, however. Proposed
amendments to the Rule would require that a litigant be warned in
writing of a potential Rule 11 violation with an explanation of the

violation before sanctions can be imposed? 19 After a warning, if a
litigant withdrew the objectionable pleading, sanctions could not be
imposed. 322 This notification requirement would greatly decrease the
potential chilling effect, and, given the historical importance of the
right of access to the courts, the proposed amendment is preferable to

Rule 11 in its current form. Even if the notification requirement were
adopted, however, that modification would still be inadequate. Any
amendment short of abolition of the objective standard and reinstitution of the subjective bad faith standard provides insufficient protection to the rights of individuals to petition the judiciary.
Another proposed amendment would permit courts to impose

nonmonetary sanctions.321 Although not explicitly provided for in
Rule 11, courts have infrequently imposed nonmonetary sanctions
that directly infringe upon the right of access to the courts.32 In the
most restrictive instances, courts have ordered that a sanctioned party
317. See Stephen B. Burbank, Comment, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power 11 HoIsTRA L. Rnv. 997,
1006 (1983). In his article, Burbank raises the question of the Supreme Court's power to
require the imposition of sanctions for non-willful conduct. The improper purpose component of Rule 11, however, conforms with the subjective bad faith requirements of the colonial laws and, as such, is not constitutionally infirm. See supra notes 110-12, 314-15. Rule
11 should therefore survive a facial constitutional challenge.
318. See William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1013, 1017
(1988). Judge Schwarzer asserts that "there is good ground for arguing that the standard a
court will apply under Rule 11 is unpredictable." Id. He is not entirely convinced, however, that "this unpredictability has chilled advocacy" because "proof that conduct has
been deterred is elusive." Id. Compare Schwarzer with Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation ofAmerican Civil Procedure:The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925,
1941 (1989) (arguing that Rule 11 has proven unpredictable in practice and can translate
into "over-deterrence" and result in "chilling" legitimate advocacy); see Note, Plausible
Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REv. 630, 641
(1987).
319. See Henry J. Reske, A Kinder, Gentler Rule 11: Committee Backs Warning Requirement to Prevent Surprise Attack, 77 A.B.A. J. 25 (Aug. 1991).
320. Id. at 25
321. Id.
322. The proffered reason for imposing nonmonetary sanctions is the asserted need to
carefully tailor sanctions "to the circumstances of the particular situation" and to "protect
the litigants and possible future clients from further misfeasance." United States v. Still-
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not file "any further causes of action until all monetary sanctions imposed have been paid in full and satisfactory proof thereof has been
furnished." 313 This type of sanction denies individuals access for all
lawsuits, including those that do not arise out of the same set of operafive facts as the lawsuit in which sanctions were originally imposed.
This is a drastic remedy that goes well beyond the sanction remedies
historically provided.
Courts can employ less drastic alternatives that preserve a litigant's right of access while simultaneously deterring frivolous conduct.
These alternatives include a contempt finding for failure to pay a
3
court order imposing sanctions,324 dismissal of the original lawsuit, 25
or, in the most egregious case, a requirement that a litigious party
submit a complaint to the court for review prior to issuance of the
summons. 326 If courts deny litigants the opportunity to pursue lawsuits which are unrelated to previously sanctioned actions, however,
they are denying litigants their First Amendment right of access to the
courts. Care must be taken to fashion nonmonetary sanctions narrowly. to preserve the constitutional right to petition the courts for
redress of grievances.
2. The Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine and the Definition of Petitioning
As illustrated, petitioning encompassed only direct attempts to
receive redress in the legislative, executive, or judicial arena. Publication of a petition to anyone other than those reasonably believed responsible 327
for providing redress resulted in abrogation of petitioner
immunity.
The immunity extended to petitioners Was not, however,
dependent on the subject matter of the petition. For example, petitions submitted to the courts were granted immunity regardless of
whether the litigation encompassed issues on matters of public concern, purely private disputes, or commercial transactions.32 The
Supreme Court has failed to take note of this history when evaluating
petitioners' claims of immunity to the antitrust laws.
In a series of cases beginning with Eastern Railroad Presidents
well, 810 F.2d 135,136 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 973 (1988) (imposing sanctions
pursuant to FED. R.ApP. P. 46).
323. Daniels v. Stovall, 660 F. Supp. 301, 306 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
324. See, e.g., Vakalis v. Shawmut Corp., 925 F.2d 34, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1991).
325. See Naked City, Inc. v. Aregood. 117 F.R.D. 634, 637 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
326. See Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905, 912 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
327. See supra notes 171-72, 267-68, 278 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 270-77 and accompanying text.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

MIo. 21:15

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,3 29 the Supreme Court
granted immunity from the antitrust laws to petitioners who joined
together to seek the passage and enforcement of laws. In Noerr,
forty-one truck drivers and their trade associations filed a lawsuit
against twenty-four railroads, an association of railroad presidents,
and a public relations firm hired by the railroads alleging that the defendants conspired to create and implement a negative publicity campaign designed to influence legislation regarding truck weight limits
and tax rates on heavy trucks.3 30 The Supreme Court held that even if
the truckers could establish that the railroads' sole purpose in pursuing the executive veto was to "destroy the truckers as competitors for
the long-distance freight business" there would be no antitrust liability.33 1 Although the Court based its decision on the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court also reasoned that prohibitions against group
lobbying efforts would impair a group's ability to make its views
known to lawmakers. The Court would not "lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade" the First Amendment right to petition government.3 3 2 The Court, however, qualified the immunity enjoyed by
petitioners:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor
and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified. 3 3
Four years later in 1965, the Supreme Court again addressed a
claim of immunity from the antitrust laws. In United Mine Workers v.
Pennington,334 unions and mine operators united to petition the executive branch of the federal government, specifically, the Secretary of
Labor, to secure legislation requiring higher minimum wages for certain coal contractors. 335 In conformity with Noerr,the Supreme Court
held these concentrated efforts to influence minimum wage legislation
were immune from the antitrust laws even if the petitioners' sole purpose was to eliminate competition and even if the conduct was "part
of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act. ' 336 The
Court, however, again did not clarify whether the immunity was pre329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

365 U.S. 127 (1961).
Id at 129-30.
Id at 138-39.
Id. at 138.
Id at 144.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
Id at 660.
Id at 670.
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mised on the Sherman Act or on the First Amendment right to
petition.
Seven years after Pennington, the Court clearly based its immunity decision on the First Amendment. In CaliforniaMotor Transport
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,33 7 the petitioning efforts were directed toward the judiciary and administrative agencies. In this case, highway
carriers alleged that another group of carriers instituted both federal
and state actions to defeat the applications of its competitors for carrier certificates.338 The Supreme Court specifically based its immunity
decision on the First Amendment Petition Clause ruling that those
who join together "to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests
vis-a-vis
33 9
their competitors" are immune from antitrust liability.
But the Court distinguished the adjudicatory setting in Trucking
Unlimited from the political activities in Noerr and Pennington and
concluded: "Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are
not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process. '340 The Court
further ruled that allegations that the petitioners' alleged attempts to
deprive their competitors from meaningful access to both the courts
and the administrative tribunals by filing "baseless, repetitive" claims,
if proven, would be sufficient to establish a sham and thereby abrogate immunity. 341 The Court thus found anticompetitive intent relevant to the immunity issue in the context of judicial proceedings.
In the most recent petitioner immunity decision, Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,Inc.,34 2 the Supreme Court clarified the
distinction between private action and public or political action. The
Court found "the source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive
restraint" relevant to immunity. 343 Because the allegedly anticompeti337. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
338. Id. at 509.
339. Id. at 510-11; see also Note, supra note 183, at 1062 (noting that while vexatious
litigation may be grounds for antitrust litigation, the Court has strongly affirmed the right
to petition).
340. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 513. The Court cited perjury of witnesses, fraud,
and bribery as examples of misrepresentations. Id.
341. Id. The Court has since defined the sham exception in the context of litigation as
"evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims." Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973).
342. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
343. Id. at 499. Trucking Unlimited and Allied Tube have been viewed as an expansion
of the sham exception and thus an erosion of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine as originally
articulated. Stanley E. Crawford, Jr. & Andy A. Tschoepe II,The Erosion of Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 13 ST. MARY's LJ.291, 301-02 (1981). Although this may not have
been the intention of the Supreme Court, the Court has failed to define the limits of the
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tive conduct in Allied Tube was undertaken to influence a private association that set safety standards, and not to directly influence the
government, the Court ruled that the petitioners were not immune
from antitrust liability. 34
The rulings of the Supreme Court in this series of cases are premised on both an overinclusive and an underinclusive definition of
petitioning. Although the Court did not squarely base its decision in
Noerr on the First Amendment Petition Clause, at least some of the
allegedly anticompetitive conduct that the Court protected exceeded
the historic definition of petitioning. To the extent it protected such
conduct, the Court's definition of petitioning was overinclusive. For
example, the publicity campaign in Noerr allegedly included distributing false reports to the public, suppliers and customers of the truckers,
and public officials.345 The reports were allegedly made to appear as
spontaneous declarations and opinions of concerned citizens groups.
But the opinions were really a product of the publicity campaign. Because the Petition Clause was not historically understood to encompass indirect attempts to influence legislation,34 the immunity the
Court granted the railroads for its other activities must have derived
from the Sherman Act. The only activity which would fit within an
historic definition of petitioning were the reports sent to the public
officials. If the railroads sent the reports to support their opinions
about the legislation, the Court should have held the railroads immune from antitrust liability under the First Amendment Petition
Clause as opposed to finding immunity under the Sherman Act. In
contrast, the unions and mine workers in Penningtonengaged in direct
attempts to influence the executive to establish high minimum wages.
Since this was a direct attempt to influence legislation, the Pennington
Court should have directly based its immunity decision on the First
Amendment.
Although the Court reached the proper result under the First
Amendment in Trucking Unlimited, it did so by fashioning an underinsham exception to petitioner immunity under the antitrust laws. See generally Daniel R.
Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and
Limits of the Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 80 (1977) (arguing that inconsistent application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine stems from the Court's failure to
clearly articulate the basis for the doctrine).
344. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 501-05.
345. The decision of the trial court provides a more detailed discussion of the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957), affid, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
346. See supra notes 81-119 and accompanying text.
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clusive definition of petitioning. The Court focused on the fact that
litigation generally involves commercial and not political activity, and
commercial activity justifies closer scrutiny of anticompetitive intent.
Similarly, in Allied Tube, the Court reached the correct conclusion on
the immunity issue, but again, the Court focused on whether the allegedly anticompetitive conduct involved political activity with a negative
commercial impact, or whether the activity was primarily commercial
with a political impact, the latter activity being unprotected from the
antitrust laws.3 7
Whether petitioning occurs in the judicial, executive, or legislative arena, petitioner immunity should not be abrogated unless the
petitioning is pursued in subjective bad faith or is frivolous or vexatious. 3 1 Thus, in all of these antitrust cases, the Court should have
phrased the issues as follows: 1) Was there a direct attempt to petition
the executive, legislature, or judiciary? If so: 2) Was the petition
3 49 If
presented in subjective bad faith or was it frivolous or vexatious?
so, there can be no intent to petition government for a redress of
grievances. The sole intent underlying the petition should be deemed
an intent to harass or to achieve an anticompetitive result. Interpreting antitrust immunity in this manner provides a clear standard for the
sham exception to petitioner immunity while preserving the historical
First Amendment right to petition. This interpretation simultaneously

347. It is indeed questionable whether the activity involved in Allied Tube was any less
political than the activity involved in Noerr, given the fact that the standards adopted by
the private association were routinely adopted by states. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 512
(White, J., dissenting).
348. In the judicial arena, subjective bad faith or sham litigation could be established by
a pattern of baseless repetitive claims. Further, subjective bad faith also could be found in
a single baseless lawsuit. See Comment, supra note 197, at 1524 & n.43; supra notes 110-12
and accompanying text.
349. Several authors have advocated the use of a malicious prosecution standard as a
limitation on antitrust immunity. See, e.g., Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious
Prosecutionand Abuse of Process,86 HAv. L. Rev. 715,727-31 (1973). One author urges
the reverse; that is, that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine should be utilized in malicious
prosecution actions to protect those who petition government. Eric M. Jacobs, Comment,
Protectingthe FirstAmendment Right to Petition: Immunity for Defendants in Defamation
Actions Through Application of the Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 147,

168-71 (1981).
This standard may, in essence, produce the same result as the standard advocated in
this Article. The latter standard, however, is tailored to mirror colonial restrictions on
petitioning. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text; cf. Smith, supra note 6, at
1192-93 ("The sham exception provides enough protection to the private interests implicated in petitioning without unduly impairing the constitutional right.").
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protects the free enterprise system and economic freedom which the
antitrust laws were designed to promote.
Conclusion
In assessing the appropriate level of protection petitioners should
enjoy pursuant to the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Supreme
Court has given scant consideration to the evolution and history of the
right to petition prior to its incorporation into the First Amendment.
History reveals that the right to petition evolved in both England and
America into a broad right which was distinct from and superior to
the rights of speech, press, and assembly. Petitioning encompassed
both individuals and collective written requests which were submitted
to the executive, legislative, or the judicial branch of government.
This right was generally not curtailed. In contrast, the rights of speech
and the press were burdened by seditious libel laws. The right of assembly was also restricted via regulations which either limited the
number of individuals allowed to present petitions or required groups
to act in a peaceful, orderly manner.
Yet the Supreme Court has ignored these historical facts and has
treated the right to petition as a right co-extensive with the other expressive rights of the First Amendment. The court has thereby collapsed the historically superior right to petition into the other
historically inferior rights of the First Amendment. The Court has incorrectly concluded that the First Amendment Petition Clause should
not provide a substantive right of access to the courts unless free
speech rights are also implicated. The Court has also improperly
granted only a limited immunity to petitioners: it has denied petitioners the absolute immunity from private libel actions as was enjoyed
historically; and in the context of antitrust laws, the Court has conditioned petitioner immunity on a definition of petitioning that is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. Another immunity issue arises
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 which, as applied to prefiling factual and legal inquiries, includes within its coverage negligent
conduct historically immune from sanctions. Finally, in direct contradiction to the debates surrounding the framing of the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Supreme Court has erroneously concluded
that the right to petition government has never included a duty of
government response. A careful examination of historical practices
reveals not only that the Supreme Court's analysis of petitioning is
misguided, but that the Court has it backwards: the right to petition
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was the important right; its development preceded and fostered the
evolution speech, assembly, and the press.

